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IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2, et seq. and Rules 3 and 4, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Viewing the facts and inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to 
plaintiffs, are there material fact issues precluding summary judgment? 
B. Did the trial court apply the wrong standard of causation to plaintiffs' claims of 
breach of fiduciary duty? 
VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The appeals court views the facts and inferences from the facts in a light most favorable 
to the party against whom summary judgment was entered, and reviews legal conclusions of the 
trial court for correctness. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 
880, 885 (Utah 1993); Christensen v. Burns International Security Service, 844 P.2d 992, 993 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). "Correctness" means no deference is given to the trial court's rulings 
on questions of law. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Entitlement to summary 
judgment is such a question of law for which no deference is due the trial court's determination. 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
VH. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Vm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
Plaintiffs sued their Washington D.C. lawyers for intentional breaches of the fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and confidentiality. Defendants moved the trial court for summary judgment 
on proximate causation. Defendants conceded, for the purpose of the motion, that (a) they owed 
plaintiffs fiduciary duties of loyalty and confidentiality, and (b) material fact issues existed on 
whether they had intentionally breached those duties, and whether plaintiffs sustained nearly 
$20,000,000 in damages. 
The District Court heard oral argument on January 6, 1994, and granted defendants' Rule 
56 motion in a bench ruling on January 7, 1994. (Appendix, Exhibit 2.) The Order was signed on 
March 7, 1994 (Appendix, Exhibit 3), and plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on March 23, 1994. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Parties and Historical Background 
Plaintiffs Jo-Ann Wong-Kilpatrick, George Gonzales, Joe Lee, Sidny Foulger (the 
"MWTC Partners"), and Mountain West Television Company ("MWTC"), were clients of 
defendant Wiley, Rein & Fielding, a Washington D.C. law firm specializing in communications 
law (the "Wiley Firm"). (R 4031, 4046.) In early 1981, the FCC announced it would make 
available through comparative hearing process a new VHF television license for Channel 13 in 
the Salt Lake City market.1 (R 5039-42, 5272-73, 5290-91.) Barry D. Wood, a communications 
attorney with Kirkland & Ellis ("K&E"), approached plaintiff David B. Lee to pursue the 
license, (id.) Based upon Mr. Wood's advice and under his counsel and direction as their 
attorney, the MWTC Partners joined as partners in MWTC, a Utah general partnership, to apply 
for the license. (R 7045, 5039-43, 5059-60, 5275-76, 5278-79, 5280-82, 5304-08.) 
From 1981 to 1987, K&E and, later, the Wiley Firm, which was formed by certain 
former K&E partners, represented MWTC and its partners in all aspects of the Channel 13 
A VHF commercial channel had not been available in the Salt Lake market since 1953. Scarcity of frequencies 
and greater power and coverage potential made the superior VHF channel a unique and very valuable license in the top 
40 TV markets. 
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application and the partnership's business. (R 5547-49, 5605, 5606-07, 5608-09, 4041.) The MWTC 
Partners developed a particularly close attorney/client relationship with Mr. Wood, who gave 
them ongoing legal and business advice necessary to pursue the Channel 13 permit. (R 4882-4983.) 
Mr. Wood requested, and the Utah Partners gave him and other members of the Wiley Firm, 
detailed, confidential information concerning the partners' personal background, experience, 
financial capability, business activities, market information, strengths and weaknesses, start up 
and programming strategies and other matters. They also gave the Firm their personal financial 
statements, which showed that the MWTC Partners had limited financial strength. (R 7043, 6072-
83, 5146-47, 4982-85, 5280-81, 4034, 5175-77, 5265-67, 5199, 5201, 5212-13, 5214-15.)2 
In 1985, Mr. Wood and the Wiley Firm represented MWTC and its partners at an FCC 
comparative hearing concerning the Channel 13 permit. (5281-82, 5304-08.) The FCC issued 
its decision in May 1985, ranking MWTC second of the five applicants. (R 6512-13,5309-13,5318-
21, 5512-13.) The Wiley Firm appealed that decision on MWTC's behalf in January 1986. (id.) 
Adams Communications 
In August 1985, Adams Communications ("Adams") approached the Wiley Firm and 
asked it to represent Adams in connection with various of Adams' television properties including 
Adams' UHF television station KSTU, Channel 20, in Salt Lake City. (R 6279-81,6291-93,5551-53, 
5322-25, 5612-19.) When plaintiffs objected to such representation, Mr. Wood wrote to them, 
stating that the firm's representation of Adams did not then present a conflict of interest, but if 
MWTC and Adams ever had conflicting interests, the Wiley Firm would not represent either 
During the five-year period of legal representation, Mr. Wood had routed copies of correspondence and other 
documents to defendant Richard E. Wiley, the senior partner of the Wiley Firm, and to Mr. John C. Quale, the partner 
in charge of the MWTC account. (R 5297-5303, 6294, 6295, 6347, 6514, 7035, 7095, 7102, 7107, 7109, 5514-15, 
5625, 5626 and 5636-39.) The purpose was to keep them current on what was happening in the Channel 13 matter. 
(Id.) Much of that information had been provided to Mr. Wood by the MWTC Partners and was considered privileged 
and confidential. (Id., see R 4609-4830, 4831-4954, 6072-83, 5515-16, 5175-76.) 
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party. (R 6289-90,5511,4041,5020,5041,5064-65.) Contrary to Mr. Wood's express representations, 
the Wiley Firm began to represent Adams in January 1986, in the "possible purchase of Channel 
13, Salt Lake City, and sale of KSTU-TV [Channel 20], Salt Lake City." (id.) John Quale, an 
attorney at the Wiley Firm who had been the senior attorney on the MWTC account, represented 
Adams in the Channel 13 and Channel 20 matters, (id., R 6348-50,5620-21.) At no time, however, 
did the Wiley Firm disclose those representations to the MWTC Partners. (R 4042, 5021-24.) 
Northstar Communications 
In approximately February 1986, Northstar Communications ("Northstar"), a corporation 
in which Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") owned 80% of the stock, was formed to invest 
in communications properties. (R 5521,5522,5558.) Upon its inception, Northstar became a client 
of the Wiley Firm. (R 5557.) Subsequently, in the spring of 1986, Bill Lincoln and Katy Glakas, 
two of Northstar's officers, approached Mr. Wood concerning the possible acquisition of a 
financial interest in Channel 13. (R 7042,5327,5331,5526-28.) Mr. Wood told them the Wiley Firm 
represented MWTC and the Firm would have a conflict in representing Northstar in the matter. 
(R 7042.) He stated that the Wiley Firm was representing MWTC to obtain financing at the time 
and that Northstar would have to secure other counsel in any dealings with MWTC. (R 7042, 
5332-34.) Mr. Wood did feel it would be appropriate to introduce Mr. Lincoln and Ms. Glakas 
to the MWTC Partners, which he did. (R 4964.) He did not inform MWTC that Defendant Wiley 
was a director of Northstar, that Northstar had its corporate offices in the Wiley Firm, or that 
Northstar was a client of the Wiley Firm. (R 5328-29, 5330, 5335, 5045,4961.) 
During the spring of 1986, Mr. Wood and the Wiley Firm continued to represent MWTC 
and its partners. Mr. Wood's services included, among other things, frequent and ongoing 
conversations with the MWTC principals and with Mr. Lincoln and Ms. Glakas concerning 
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Northstar's and Allstate's possible investment in Channel 13, and a buy-out of the other 
applicants for the Channel 13 permit. (R 6619-6850, 4961-65, 5334-35.) He advised the MWTC 
Partners that the permit had "immense value," that independent stations were selling at 
"stratospheric prices," and that they should seek money from an investor to buy out the other 
applicants and to finance construction and start-up of the station. (R 6513,7096,5048-50,5102.) He 
spent considerable time consulting with his partners at the Wiley Firm, meeting with potential 
investors, negotiating with other applicants, and performing other work to enable MWTC to 
obtain financing for the permit and to buy out the competing applicants. (R 6619-6850.) 
The Wiley Firm's Decision to Represent Northstar 
On June 11, 1986, Mr. Wiley and Mr. Quale went to Mr. Wood's office and "announced 
that the Firm would represent Northstar in this matter after all." (R 6570, 6689, 7043, 4183,4557.) 
They stated that "this was necessary because Northstar . . . and Allstate would go to another 
firm for counsel and all of its business might then be handled by another firm." (R 7043,5350-52, 
5555, 5557,5567.) Mr. Wiley emphasized that Northstar and Allstate "would be the bigger client, 
more important client." (R 5354, 5645.) Mr. Wood informed Mr. Wiley and Mr. Quale that the 
Wiley Firm could not represent Northstar against MWTC and that he had earlier told 
Mr. Lincoln that Northstar would have to secure separate counsel. (R 5350-53, 7042-43.) He also 
told them the Firm could not ethically represent anyone who would enter a deal with MWTC, 
because MWTC was a long-standing client of the Firm, (id.) Mr. Wood recognized that the 
Wiley Firm had confidential information about the MWTC Partners and he did not feel that the 
decision to represent Northstar was appropriate or ethical. (R 7043.) As a young partner, 
however, he felt he had no choice in the matter, (id.) Despite his objections, Mr. Wiley directed 
him to obtain the consent of MWTC. (id., 5355-58.) 
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Barry Wood's Testimony Regarding Consent 
Mr. Wood testified that following his meeting with Mr. Wiley and Mr. Quale, he 
telephoned Joe Lee and informed him that the Wiley Firm wanted also to represent Northstar 
"on the transaction" with MWTC and that the Firm wanted the MWTC Partners' consent to do 
so. (R 5378-82.) Mr. Lee said he would check into the matter, (id.) He later called Mr. Wood 
and said that the partnership would not consent. (R 5381-5384.) Although Mr. Wood claims he 
then telephoned certain but not all of the other partners of MWTC who allegedly stated that the 
firm could also represent Northstar "on the deal," he admitted (1) he never disclosed to them 
what the nature and extent of the Wiley Firm's representation of Northstar would be or who in 
the Firm would be doing the work for Northstar; (2) he did not explain to them the conflicts that 
existed, the legal implications, the possible risks and effects on plaintiffs, or other circumstances 
relating to the proposed representation; (3) he did not tell them that Mr. Wiley had decided the 
Firm would represent Northstar because it perceived Northstar/Allstate as the more important 
clients and would not lose their business by referring the matter to another firm; and (4) he did 
not tell them that Allstate was also a client of the Firm, or that the Firm was representing Adams 
in matters relating to Channel 13. (R 4046, 5385-93, 5398-5411.) 
Mr. Wood stated that he later met with Mr. Quale and related to him the conversations 
with some of the MWTC principals. (R 5413-5414.) He informed Mr. Quale that Joe Lee's son, 
David Lee, had strongly objected to such representation. (R 7044, 5414-17.) Mr. Quale decided 
that because David Lee was not an actual partner in MWTC at the time, his objection did not 
change the matter; the Firm would represent Northstar anyway.3 ad.) In a memorandum 
3David Lee was one of the original partners of MWTC when Mr. Wood formed the partnership in 1981. Mr. Wood 
later stated in a memorandum that "in retrospect, it would have been a good idea to have attempted to obtain the consents 
of the partners in writing. Neither John Quale nor anyone else at Wiley, Rein ever suggested that I should do so or 
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prepared approximately eight months later, Mr. Wood stated that in June 1986 he was not aware 
that the Wiley Firm had assumed the role of general counsel to Northstar or that the Firm had 
promised to represent Northstar on all matters, even ones in which it "had a prior responsibility 
to an existing client [MWTC]." (R 6470.) He further admitted that he did not even know at the 
time he spoke to certain of the MWTC principals what the Wiley Firm would eventually do or 
what the consequences of the firm's action on behalf of Northstar would be. (R 5398-99.) 
Testimony of MWTC Principals Regarding Consent 
Plaintiffs Wong-Kilpatrick and Gonzales, two MWTC Partners, testified that Mr. Wood 
had never called them to obtain their consent. (R 5253-56,5227.) They were never advised of the 
Wiley Firm's representation of Northstar until much later, (id.) Joe Lee testified that Mr. Wood 
never told him the Wiley Firm could not represent him or MWTC in the negotiations with 
Northstar. He stated that Mr. Wood initially called him and asked if Mr. Lee would object to 
the Firm's simultaneous representation of Northstar and MWTC. (R 4958-60,5009-12,5017-18,5019.) 
Joe Lee then spoke to his son David Lee, who was angered at the thought and said the Wiley 
Firm could not do so. (Id.) Joe Lee telephoned Mr. Wood and said the partnership would not 
agree, (id.) David Lee also informed Mr. Wood that such representation would be a serious 
breach and that the partners would not consent. (R 5082-84.) Both David and Joe Lee then felt 
the matter was closed and the simultaneous, adverse representation would not take place. (R 5085-
88.) 
The MWTC Partners testified that if Mr. Wood had disclosed to them the conflicts, facts, 
risks and implications of the Wiley Firm's decision to represent Northstar against the MWTC 
needed to do so. It would, in fact, have been a futile exercise. Because of David's displeasure with the firm's switching 
sides, looking back I believe that he would have dissuaded all of the partners except for Sid Foulger from signing a 
document evidencing their consent to the change." (7044-45.) 
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Partners, they would have had no further dealings with the Wiley Firm or with 
Northstar/Allstate. (R 5235, 5236, 5240, 5130, 5131-32, 5133, 5134-35, 5138, 5148, 5036-37.) MWTC would 
have employed independent counsel to represent them in pursuing other contacts and in obtaining 
financing from Other parties. (R 4972-73, 5027, 4031-33, 5130, 5131-32, 5133, 5134-35, 5138, 5148, 5036-37.) 
Instead, without knowledge of the conflicts of the Wiley Firm or of the extent and consequences 
of those conflicts, the MWTC Partners trusted and relied on the Wiley Firm to represent their 
interests fully and loyally as the Firm had done during the previous five years, including repre-
sentation in negotiations with Northstar/Allstate. (R 5059, 5119, 4961, 4966, 5152.) 
Wiley Firm's Continued Representation of MWTC 
Following the failed attempt to obtain consent, the Wiley Firm and Mr. Wood, as shown 
by 1986 daily time entries and MWTC billing statements, continued to perform extensive legal 
services for MWTC and its partners, including numerous meetings, conversations and 
negotiations with Northstar concerning financing and the formation of a joint venture between 
MWTC and Northstar/Allstate. (R 5420-26, 6689-6752.) 
In the summer and fall of 1986, Mr. Wood also had frequent meetings with other 
members of the Wiley Firm, the MWTC Partners, various potential investors, and the other 
applicants for the station construction permit. (R 6683-6783, 4557-72, 5427-48, 5100-01.) He worked 
extensively, as counsel for the MWTC Partners, to negotiate financing for them to buy out the 
other applicants, obtain the station permit, and put the station in operation, (id.) His services 
were performed on almost a daily basis with respect to a wide variety of matters relating to 
Channel 13. (id.) In short, during this critical period there was no reason for the MWTC 
Partners to believe that the scope of his representation of MWTC had changed in any way from 
what it had been before. (R 4033,5089-90.) MWTC and its partners continued to rely fully on Mr. 
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Wood and the Wiley Firm as their attorneys, in all matters involving Channel 13. (R 5059,5119, 
4961, 4966, 5152.) Unknown to MWTC, however, Mr. Wood was performing legal work for 
Northstar in the fall of 1986, which was billed to Northstar. (R 6852-67.) 
Mr. Wood, as counsel for MWTC, contacted Communications Partners Limited ("CPL"), 
a potential investor. (R 6671-6752,4550-68,5335-48,5451-54.) He reviewed financing proposals from 
CPL and Northstar/Allstate, and discussed them with the MWTC Partners. (R 7049-55, 7056-59, 
7060-65, 7066-71, 7072-79.) Northstar and CPL sent written financing offers to Mr. Wood and he 
transmitted them to the MWTC Partners, (id.) He also gave the MWTC Partners legal and 
financial advice concerning the competing offers, and handled negotiations on behalf of MWTC 
with Mr. Lincoln and Ms. Glakas throughout the summer of 1986. (id., 6683-6735,4556-64,5534-36.) 
In the late summer of 1986, following a series of negotiations, both Northstar and CPL 
made commitments to MWTC to provide at least $10 million in return for a 60% interest in the 
Channel 13 venture. (R 4969, 4972-73, 4985, 5049-51, 5102-03, 5115, 4031-33, 4035-37, 5152, 5203, 5245, 
5246.) Mr. Wood went to Utah and met with the MWTC Partners and counseled them to accept 
the Northstar offer. (R 5245, 5102-03.) They relied on Mr. Wood, who was acting as their 
attorney, in following that counsel, (id.) Mr. Wood then personally informed CPL on behalf of 
his clients that MWTC would not go with CPL, but had decided to accept the Northstar offer, 
(id., 5103-04, 5107-08, 5114-16, 5122.) In reliance on Mr. Wood as their attorney, the MWTC 
Partners looked to a large degree on contacts he told them he had and on his initiative to obtain 
financing. (R 5059, 5132, 5139, 4961, 4966, 5036-37, 5027, 4031-33, 5152.) Later, they relied on his 
recommendation that they accept the Northstar financing commitment, (id.) Because of their 
reliance on the Wiley Firm and Mr. Wood, the MWTC Partners forewent the opportunity to 
obtain the committed financing from CPL or to pursue other financing sources. 
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After Northstar and Allstate had committed $10 million to the venture and Mr. Wood had 
informed CPL that MWTC had accepted the Northstar/Allstate commitment, Mr. Wood and the 
Wiley Firm, as counsel for MWTC, negotiated agreements to buy out the interests of the other 
station applicants in the fall of 1986. (R 6696-6783; 5105-06.) The agreements, drafted by the Wiley 
Firm, created certain deadlines and called for MWTC to buy out the other applicants for a total 
of $5 million, which was to come out of Northstar's $10 million commitment, (id., 4035-36.) 
Unknown to MWTC was the fact that two of the complex agreements drafted by the Wiley Firm 
unconditionally and personally obligated the MWTC Partners to pay $3 million of the $5 million 
buyout price, regardless of whether funding from the Northstar commitment was ever realized. 
Mr. Wood counseled his clients to sign the agreements but did not explain the legal implications 
or liabilities arising under the agreements. (R 5109, 51 io, 5111-12, 4971, 5180-81, 5208, 5154-55, 5156, 
5159-60.) 
Dow, Lohnes & Albertson 
At some point in the summer of 1986, plaintiff Sidney Foulger and his family (the 
"Foulger Family") contacted Ralph Hardy, a close family friend and communications attorney 
at Dow, Lohnes & Albertson ("DL&A"), to seek an independent assessment of the station values 
and financial information given to MWTC by Mr. Wood. (R 4034-35.) The Foulger Family also 
sought Mr. Hardy's views and advice concerning financial issues relating to Channel 13. (id.) 
His efforts were on behalf of the Foulger Family as a financial adviser only. (R 4035,5080-81,5076-
78.) He did not serve as MWTC's counsel in connection with the dealings with Northstar/ 
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Allstate or with the other permit applicants, (id., 5094.) Also, Mr. Hardy never advised MWTC 
and its partners in any way regarding the Wiley Firm's numerous conflicts of interest.4 
During July through November 1986, the MWTC Partners continued to look to and rely 
on the Wiley Firm and Mr. Wood to serve as counsel for MWTC and its partners in all matters 
relating to Channel 13. (R 4033,4035,5059,5089-90,5119,4961,4966,5152.) Although they understood 
that Mr. Hardy was a financial consultant for the Foulger Family, they did not consider 
Mr. Hardy to be MWTC's attorney in any way. (R 5080-81.) Even Mr. Wood's time entries relat-
ing to legal services he performed on behalf of the MWTC Partners show he had numerous 
discussions and meetings with Northstar representatives and plaintiffs in the summer of 1986. 
(R 6683-6735.) Mr. Hardy is not shown as participating in those conversations or meetings, (id.) 
November 1986 Squeeze-Down Meetings 
Once the Wiley Firm had prepared the agreements for the buyout of the other Channel 
13 permit applicants, the Firm then simultaneously represented Northstar and MWTC in 
November 1986 in preparing and reducing to writing the agreements for the venture between 
Northstar and MWTC. (R 5455-60, 6266-69, 5650-52, 5662-64.) That venture consisted of a Utah 
limited partnership known as MWT, Ltd., formed under the direction of the Wiley Firm. (R 
8301.) The new terms of the Wiley-drafted documents were contrary to the deal which had been 
previously agreed to and were very detrimental to MWTC and its partners. Among other things, 
without negotiation they arbitrarily reduced the committed $10 million to under $7 million. 
(R 7933, 5246-47.) They also provided that MWT Corporation, a Utah corporation formed under 
There is no evidence that Mr. Hardy was even aware of the nature, extent and risks to MWTC and its partners of 
the Wiley Firm's conflicts of interest arising as a result of that firm's simultaneous adverse representation of MWTC and 
its partners, Adams, Northstar, and Allstate, and of Mr. Wiley's personal business involvement as a director of 
Northstar. 
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the direction of the Wiley Firm for the MWTC Partners, would serve as the general partner of 
MWT, Ltd. for only a short time. (R 7856, 5556.) Northstar would then become the general 
partner with full management control of the station. (R 7856.) The MWTC Partners were 
thereafter to be limited partners only, (id.) 
These terms were contrary to Mr. Wood's prior advice and subverted the very purpose 
of the Wiley Firm's representation of plaintiffs during the previous six years. The MWTC 
Partners' desire and dream had always been to manage, operate and control the station 
themselves. (R 5289-92, 5336-37.) Now, unknown to them and contrary to representations made 
to the FCC, the Wiley Firm was representing Northstar to drastically reduce the commitment, 
to take away plaintiffs' control and make plaintiffs nothing more than a "public relations bridge 
to the Salt Lake City community." (R 6605.) Under the CPL commitment, which Mr. Wood 
advised MWTC to turn down, the MWTC Partners would have retained control of Channel 13. 
(R 7092-94.) 
When a meeting was held at the Wiley Firm's Washington, D.C. offices in mid-
November 1986 to close the transaction with Northstar/Allstate, the MWTC Partners expected 
to see written agreements that would memorialize the terms of the Northstar/Allstate 
commitment made in the late summer of 1986. (R 5466-69,5025-26.) Instead, in the middle of the 
night they learned of the substantial changes that had been made in the agreements prepared by 
the Wiley Firm. The MWTC Partners also discovered for the first time that they were personally 
and unconditionally liable for at least $1 million under one of the settlement agreements 
negotiated and prepared by Mr. Wood on their behalf, (id., 5470-73, 5180-81, 5202, 5204, 5206-07, 
5155, 5159-60, 5025-26.) In proceeding with the buyout agreements with the other applicants, the 
MWTC Partners had relied on Northstar's commitment to provide $10 million and did not know 
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they were personally obligated for any of the buyout payments. (R 5169-70,5171-72,5099,5207,5208, 
5154, 5157-58.) Mr. Wood did not inform them of their liability until the mid-November meeting 
to close the transaction, (id.) 
Because of the changes made in the Northstar/Allstate funding agreement, extensive 
discussions ensued around the clock over a three-day period. During the course of those 
discussions, the MWTC Partners and even Mr. Wood strongly objected that the commitment by 
Northstar/Allstate had been reduced from $10 million to less than $7 million. (R 5474, 5025-26.) 
The Foulger Family was particularly upset about Sidny Foulger's personal liability for $1 million 
under one of the buyout agreements and asked Mr. Hardy to do what he could to protect Mr. 
Foulger's interests. (R 5186-94, 5167.) Mr. Hardy did not serve as an attorney for MWTC or the 
MWTC Partners. (R 4034-35, 5184.) The MWTC Partners continued to regard and look to 
Mr. Wood as their attorney. Nothing in Mr. Wood's conduct or the scope of his representation 
of MWTC and its partners led them to believe otherwise. (R 6773-75, 5071-78, 5089-90,4033.) Mr. 
Wood, in fact, recorded over 40 hours during those three days for his services as counsel for 
MWTC. (R 6773-75.) 
Also, during the mid-November meetings to close the Northstar/Allstate financing 
transaction, three of the four MWTC Partners were in Salt Lake City. (R 5044,5478.) It was Mr. 
Wood who telephoned them, explained the partnership documents to them, and gave them legal 
advice concerning the transaction, (id., 5025-26, 5242-43, 5246-47, 5248-49.) It came as a shock to 
them that new terms were then being dictated. (R 4047.) 
When the Wiley Firm confirmed to those present that the funding would be less than $7 
million, David Lee objected to the changed terms and reminded the attorneys that the Wiley 
Firm was representing MWTC. (R 5090-98.) One of the Wiley Firm attorneys who was not then 
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aware of the Firm's representation of MWTC responded that the firm was not representing 
MWTC, but rather Northstar. (R 6273-74.) Mr. Wood then objected to what was happening and 
forcefully stated that MWTC was a client of the firm and had been a client since 1981. (R 6479, 
6275-77, 5094-97.) He emphasized that the Wiley Firm owed duties to MWTC and that "the firm 
could not do this to their client." It would be unethical, (id.) 
When the MWTC Partners who were in Utah refused to go along with the changed deal, 
Mr. Wood (a) spoke to them by telephone, (b) informed them that one of the buyout agreements 
personally obligated them for $1 million, (c) asked if they wished to be liable for that amount, 
and (d) told them that they had no alternative but to go through with the changed deal. (R 5248-
49,5025-26.) He then assured them, despite the changes made to the agreements, they would still 
become millionaires. (R 4047.) The MWTC Partners testified that they had no choice. They had 
to sign the documents, and they did so under extreme duress.5 (R 5097-98, 5248-49, 4971-75, 5025-
26.) 
Mr. Wood also acknowledged that $3 million of the total $10 million had vanished, 
contrary to the prior agreement and "representations that had been made to induce the MWTC 
Partners to negotiate with Northstar at that level." (R 6471.) Mr. Wood was so upset about the 
change that he challenged his own firm on the issue. (id.) His objections did not change the 
matter. Because of the MWTC Partners' personal liability for the $1 million payment, coupled 
with the Monday due date for the $2 million payment and the pending appeal, there was no 
alternative but to accede to the changed terms dictated by the Wiley Firm and its other clients, 
5Mr. Wood testified that he knew they were in a "terrible position" because they also had to pay $2 million to one 
of the other applicants on the Monday following the weekend meetings and they had no other financing alternatives avail-
able at the time. (R 5476-77.) Mr. Quale was aware that the MWTC Partners were personally liable for buyout 
payments owing to the other applicants and that the dealings between Northstar and the MWTC Partners at the mid-
November meetings were being driven by the $2 million payment that was due the following Monday. (R 5659.) 
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Northstar and Allstate. (R 4974-80,5262,5162,5170.) Even though the MWTC Partners then learned 
that the Wiley Firm represented Northstar against them, it was too late to seek other financing 
or other counsel. By that time they had also exhausted their funds. Mr. Wood had advised 
plaintiffs several months earlier to go with Northstar and had notified CPL of plaintiffs' decision 
to do SO. (R 5245, 5107-08, 5116.) 
Plaintiffs, through discovery in this case, learned that Mr. Wiley and the other directors 
of Northstar had approved and directed execution of the changed agreements prior to their sign-
ing. (R 6446-50.) Mr. Wiley's billings to Northstar show that he was paid for his time at the 
Northstar board meeting in which he approved what his Firm and its more prestigious clients 
were doing to MWTC and its partners. (R 4191, 4193.) 
Post-November 1986 Events 
Following execution of the changed agreements with Northstar for the formation of 
MWT, Ltd., Mr. Wood prepared and filed a petition with the FCC to substitute MWT, Ltd. for 
MWTC as the Channel 13 permit applicant. (R 5479,5667-68.) The petition sought FCC approval 
of the arrangement between Northstar and MWTC, which gave Northstar the right to become 
the general partner and take control of MWT, Ltd. and Channel 13. (R 6514-67, 5669-77.) In 
addition, based on Mr. Wood's advice, the MWTC Partners resigned from their jobs to become 
involved full-time in the station's business. (R 4981.) 
Following the mid-November squeeze-down, members of the Wiley Firm began to 
criticize Mr. Wood for his "misguided loyalty" to the MWTC Partners and his objections to 
what the Firm and Northstar/Allstate had done during the mid-November meetings. (R 6451-58, 
5686-87, 5690.) The criticism focused on Mr. Wood's belief that Northstar and the Wiley Firm 
had breached duties owing to the MWTC Partners. (R 6451-58,5493-96,5691,5692-93.) Mr. Wood 
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responded that MWTC had been a client of the Firm since 1981 and was still a client. (R 6462.) 
He then cited ethical rules governing the Firm's duties to MWTC (R 6462-64), and stated: 
Certainly my consultation with the MWTC principals on the subject of our 
representation of Northstar did not include a warning that we would operate in 
an unprofessional fashion on behalf of Northstar in order to gain an advantage for 
Northstar over MWTC. (R 6464.) 
Despite Mr. Wood's objections, the Wiley Firm continued to give legal advice to 
Northstar in all matters involving the MWTC Partners and the business of Channel 13. (R 6446-
50, 7017-18, 4191-97.) Among other things, the Firm advised Northstar in early 1987 concerning 
the purchase by MWT, Ltd. of Channel 20 from Adams. (R 4196,4197, 5703-05.) The Northstar 
board of directors also met to discuss the purchase. Mr. Wiley, as a member of the board of 
directors and as counsel for Northstar, and Mr. Quale were present, (id.) 
In late February 1987, the MWTC Partners, who were still represented by the Wiley 
Firm, learned about Northstar's decision to purchase Adams' Channel 20 for approximately $30 
million, and to borrow and sign a purchase contract with another of the Wiley Firm's clients, 
Adams, for the entire purchase price.6 (R 4043-44, 5066-67, 5259, 5195-96.) They did not know that 
the Wiley Firm had again been advising and providing legal services to Northstar in the matter 
contrary to plaintiffs' interests, (id.) When plaintiffs objected to the purchase, Northstar's 
representatives stated that if plaintiffs did not go along with the decision to purchase Adams' 
Channel 20, Northstar and Allstate would not provide even the funding they had agreed to at the 
squeeze down, (id.) Based on that ultimatum, the MWTC Partners again concluded they had no 
alternative but to accede once again to Northstar's decision. (R 4044-45, 5007, 5008, 5028-35.) In 
reliance on Mr. Wood's advice, Joe Lee had given up his job so he could become involved full-
6Northstar concluded that it would be advantageous to purchase an operating station and eliminate a competitor. 
Also, Northstar and Allstate did not wish to put further funds into the station. (R 5196.) 
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time with Channel 13, and the MWTC Partners were still personally liable for certain payments 
to the other applicants. (R 4044-45, 5028-35, 5291-92.) Thus, the Wiley Firm and Northstar again 
were in a position where they could take advantage of the MWTC Partners.7 
Plaintiffs testified that Northstar's decision was a further link in a chain of events set in 
motion by the Wiley Firm's failure to make full disclosure of its conflicts of interests, the facts 
relating to those conflicts, and the resulting risks and consequences to MWTC and its partners. 
(R 5060, 5131-32, 5036-37; see also 11748, 11750-51, 11757, 11767, 11770, 11775.) Had the Wiley Fi rm made 
full disclosure in June 1986 concerning its conflicting interests and decisions, plaintiffs testified 
they never would have been in a position in which Northstar and the Wiley Firm could take 
advantage of them and the resulting circumstances. (R 5133, 5134, 5148, 5235, 5036-37, 5259, 5165.) 
MWTC would have dismissed the Wiley Firm in June 1986, and the decision of 
Northstar/Allstate to purchase Channel 20 from Adams never would have been made, (id.) Had 
the MWTC Partners been given the chance to make an informed decision, they would have 
accepted the CPL funding commitment, or sought financing from another source which, as the 
evidence shows, would have enabled them to buy out the competing applicants, put the station 
in operation, and succeed in direct competition with Channel 20. (id., 6119-38.) When Mr. Wood 
and the Wiley Firm failed to discharge their fiduciary duties of loyalty, full disclosure and 
consent, MWTC and its partners lost the opportunity to obtain funding from other sources, (id., 
11748,11750,11751,11757,11767,11775.) They were then in a position where the Northstar/Allstate 
decision to purchase Adams' Channel 20, reached and carried into effect with defendants' 
assistance, could be forced upon them, (id.) 
7Mr. Quale acknowledged that he knew Joe Lee had left his job and needed funds. (R 5691.) 
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Subsequent Representation by the Wiley Firm of Various Parties 
Ralph Hardy represented MWT, Ltd. as special counsel of record before the FCC, in the 
purchase of Channel 20 from Adams.8 (R 9385, 8339, 8341, 8343, 8347.) He was not counsel for 
plaintiffs in connection with the purchase, as defendants mistakenly argued before the trial court. 
(id.) Mr. Hardy was counsel to the limited partnership, MWT, Ltd., of which both the MWTC 
partners and Northstar were a part. Mr. Hardy's duties were to the partnership, not only to the 
MWTC partners. Mr. Wood and the Wiley Firm performed legal services on behalf of MWT, 
Ltd. and Northstar, and in connection with the Channel 20 purchase, behind the scene. The 
Firm advised Northstar concerning all aspects of the Channel 20 transaction, even though it 
continued to represent both the MWTC Partners and MWT, Ltd. in Channel 13 matters. (R 6807-
50, 4059-4134.) 
During this time, Mr. Wood continued to represent the MWTC Partners. (R 4059-4134, 
5257-58,4045-46.) He represented them through June 1987 in obtaining agreements from the other 
applicants to release the MWTC Partners from the payment terms of the buyout agreements. 
He also provided legal and business advice concerning the startup of the station and 
programming matters. (R 4573-4608.) He provided further services in early 1987 to obtain 
Allstate's agreement to assume the payment obligations of MWTC and its partners under the 
buyout agreements, (id.) 
At the same time, and without plaintiffs' knowledge, other attorneys in the Wiley Firm 
represented Northstar against the MWTC Partners in connection with the partners' employment 
contracts with Channel 13, and subsequently in connection with Northstar's decision to terminate 
8The inference is that the Wiley Firm did not appear as counsel for MWT, Ltd. before the FCC in the purchase of 
Channel 20 from Adams because the Wiley Firm was counsel for Adams at the time. (R 5707.) 
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all further payments to MWTC Partners under those contracts. (R 6868-6982, 4195-4380, 5708-16.) 
No effort was made to obtain plaintiffs' consent to such representation. (R 4047.) In addition, the 
minutes of a Northstar board meeting show that Mr. Wiley and other board members, with Mr. 
Quale present as counsel for Northstar, directed Northstar to terminate payments to plaintiffs 
under their employment agreements. (R 6489-95.) 
Mr. Wood left the Wiley Firm in September 1987. (R 11656.) Shortly thereafter, the 
Wiley Firm represented Northstar in connection with the "conversion" or substitution of 
Northstar for MWT Corporation as the general partner of MWT, Ltd. (R 4209-4300.) This 
procedure was dictated by the agreements forced upon plaintiffs during the mid-November 1986 
meetings. (R 7856.) At approximately the same time, a new corporation, Farragut, was formed 
to own all of Northstar's stock. (R 5633-34.) Mr. Wiley became a 10% owner of Farragut's 
common stock and, thus, an owner of Northstar. As such, Mr. Wiley had an ownership interest 
in the general partner. (R 6356,5633-34.) Allstate was the principal shareholder of Farragut. (id.) 
As a result of the conversion, the MWTC Partners lost what little right they had to manage and 
control the station through the former general partner, MWT Corporation. (See R 6514-67.) The 
Wiley Firm and its clients, Northstar and Allstate, had succeeded in shifting total control of the 
station to Northstar. (Id.) Plaintiffs, in an effort to resist the actions of the Wiley Firm and their 
more powerful clients, sought Ralph Hardy's assistance. (R 5719.) Mr. Hardy, however, by this 
time was unable to do anything to stop or even delay the conversion, which was completed in 
May 1988. (R4956.) 
When MWT, Ltd. needed additional funds in 1989 to meet the partnership's debt 
obligations resulting from the purchase of Channel 20, the Wiley Firm simultaneously 
represented Northstar, Farragut and MWT, Ltd., even though MWT, Ltd. had interests adverse 
-19-
to those of Northstar and Farragut. Allstate was also a client of the Wiley Firm and, in fact, 
had been a client since at least 1985. (R 7048.) The Firm's services were performed in 
connection with the preparation and execution of promissory notes from MWT, Ltd. in favor 
of Allstate, bearing interest at the rate of 25 % per annum. (R 5717-35,4373-4470.) Allstate insisted, 
as a condition of providing a 25% interest-bearing loan to MWT, Ltd. to meet the station's 
short-term debt, that MWT, Ltd. sign a management contract which further obligated MWT, 
Ltd. to pay Farragut $17,500 per month. (R 7113-27.) The minutes of a Northstar board meeting 
show that the directors, including Mr. Wiley, directed Northstar, as general partner of MWT, 
Ltd., to execute a 25%-interest note in favor of Allstate. (R 6489-6495.) Mr. Quale was also 
present at the meetings, (id.) 
Ralph Hardy assisted plaintiffs in an unsuccessful attempt to resist defendants', 
Northstar's, Allstate's and Farragut's actions. (R 5197-98, 5200, 5260-61.) 
Sale of Channel 13 to Fox (1989-1990) 
The Wiley Firm also represented both Northstar and MWT, Ltd. in the decision to sell 
Channel 13 to Fox, and in opposing plaintiffs' objections to the decision. (R 6584-93,4373-4520, 
5744-46.) Allstate decided to sell because it refused to provide further funding for the operation, 
and the station's income failed to reach the levels projected by Northstar in 1987 when it decided 
to purchase Adams' Channel 20. (R 7005-08.) The station's income could not satisfy the payments 
on the $30 million debt resulting from that purchase. (W.) Mr. Wiley met with the only other 
remaining Northstar board member on January 26, 1989, and voted to sell the station. (R 6584-93, 
6489-95, 4373-4520.) 
But, before Mr. Wiley met with the Northstar board of directors to vote to sell the 
station, Mr. Wiley first personally obtained an indemnification agreement from his client 
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Allstate. (R 6501-07.) The agreement provided that Allstate would indemnify Mr. Wiley in any 
action against him by the limited partners. Allstate apparently agreed to indemnify Mr. Wiley 
so that, as a director of Northstar, he would violate his duty of loyalty to plaintiffs and vote to 
sell the station to protect Allstate's investment in Channel 13 and to reduce further risk to 
Allstate. 
Once the indemnification was in place, Allstate directed Farragut to execute a consulting 
agreement with a broker, which required payment by MWT, Ltd. of $10,000 per month. (R 6992-
95.) Allstate prepared that agreement, and the Northstar and Farragut directors, including 
Mr. Wiley, ratified it. (id.) The broker was affiliated with Veronis Suhler & Associates, another 
client of the Wiley Firm, which later received a commission of nearly $600,000 in the sale of 
the station by MWT, Ltd. to Fox Broadcasting Company ("Fox"). (R 5762-63, 6992-95,5611, 5742, 
5539, 7019-21.) 
Plaintiffs sought the assistance of Mr. Hardy to oppose the sale. (R 6997-7000.) Despite 
his objections, Northstar and Farragut, with the assistance of the Wiley Firm as their counsel, 
and Mr. Wiley, as one of two directors of each company, decided to sell the station to Fox.9 
(R 7001-03, 6496-98.)10 
When plaintiffs later threatened suit against the Wiley Firm, Allstate amended its 
indemnification agreement to protect both Mr. Wiley and his Firm, against any claims by the 
limited partners of MWT, Ltd. (R 6508-09, 5597.) With the closing of the sale, the plaintiffs lost 
9The Wiley Firm also continued to represent Allstate in certain other matters. (R 5610, 5550.) 
It is difficult to conceive of a more entangled web of conflicts between a law firm and its clients. Mr. Wiley and 
the Wiley Firm owed conflicting fiduciary duties to their clients: Allstate, Adams, Northstar, Farragut, MWT, Ltd., 
Varoneous Sueller and the plaintiffs. In the sale of Channel 13 to Fox, each had a conflicting, adverse interest. 
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, they were perceived as the lowest and least favored of the Wiley Firm clients. Thus, 
with indemnification from Allstate, Mr. Wiley breached his duties to plaintiffs. 
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everything, including (a) the value of the station license contributed to MWT, Ltd.,11 (b) their 
capital contributions, (c) the opportunity to recoup their expenses, (d) the payments due under 
their employment contracts, (e) the increase that would have been realized in the value of their 
equity interest in the station, and (f) the opportunity to own, manage and realize the appreciation 
in value of the station. (R 6159-6264, 6110-15, 5005-06, 5209-10, 5164-66, 5268.) They received no 
proceeds from the sale. Also, approximately one and one-half years later, Northstar, upon the 
advice of the Wiley Firm, sent plaintiffs a "cash call" which supposedly obligated them, as 
limited partners, to pay over $2 million for the unpaid debts of MWT, Ltd. (R 6983-87.) This 
"cash call" was based on a provision the Wiley Firm placed in the MWT, Ltd. partnership 
agreement at the mid-November 1986 meetings, (id.)12 
The facts demonstrated that (a) had Northstar/Allstate honored their commitment to fund 
the MWT, Ltd. joint venture with $10 million to buy out the other permit applicants and to 
construct and operate the station, or had MWTC obtained even $8 million from an alternative 
source of funding, and (b) had Channel 13 gone into direct competition with Channel 20, rather 
than being forced by Northstar to buy out Channel 20 as a competitor, plaintiffs' interests in the 
station would have had a value of approximately $20 million at the time summary judgment was 
entered. (R 6119-38.) 
nThe fair market value of the license contributed by the MWTC Partners was $9,530,000 as of January 1987. 
(R 6120.) 
12 
The funds demanded were to be used to pay the creditors of MWT, Ltd., one of which was the Wiley Firm's 
favored client, Allstate. (R 6594-6603, 7019-21, 6983-87.) Another creditor was Farragut, which had claimed a 
management fee of $374,697. (Id., 7027.) The cash call to plaintiffs was also issued after the Wiley Firm had received 
nearly $200,000, and the escrowed funds from the sale had been disbursed to Allstate and Farragut. (R 7028-34.) 
Again, the Wiley Firm represented Northstar in preparing the escrow documents and in sending the escrowed funds to 
Allstate. (Id.) At no time did the Wiley Firm take action to terminate its representation of MWTC or its partners. 
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Instead, due to defendants' breaches of their fiduciary duties of full disclosure and 
consent, the MWTC Partners were unknowingly placed in a position where the Wiley Firm and 
its more powerful clients, Northstar and Allstate, could take advantage of them. Those breaches 
set in motion a series of events which ultimately led to the sale of the station to Fox. (R 11748, 
11750-51,11757,11767,11770,11775.) Plaintiffs testified that had defendants made full disclosure to 
them in June 1986, they would have been able to make informed decisions as to how they would 
proceed with financing and legal representation, and they would have followed a different 
course. (R 5133,5131,5134,5148,5235,5036-37,5259,5165.) As shown by the evidence, their decision 
would have been to obtain financing from another investor, (id.) They had a commitment from 
CPL for $10 million plus a $1 million contingency, which they could have accepted had it not 
been for defendants' breaches. With even $8 million from CPL or another investor, the MWTC 
Partners could have bought out the competing applicants and placed the station in operation. 
(R 6133, 6135.) The station would have succeeded under such circumstances. (R 6119-38.) 
IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court assumed the role of fact finder and weighed the evidence, which is 
improper on summary judgment. Defendants argued that as a matter of law there was not a 
"reasonable likelihood" that plaintiffs would have obtained a better business result absent 
defendants' breaches of fiduciary duties because (a) plaintiffs were represented by other counsel 
at all times, (b) it was defendants' other clients who made the business decisions that caused 
plaintiffs' loss, (c) the CPL offer was not better than the changed Northstar/Allstate documents 
forced on plaintiffs, and (d) defendants did not receive or misuse confidential information. The 
facts are materially disputed on each of these issues. Nevertheless, the trial court chose to adopt 
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defendants' characterization of the issues, imposed the wrong standard of causation, and then 
usurped the role of the jury by weighing and finding the facts.13 
In so doing, the court ignored plaintiffs' evidence that plaintiffs were deprived of the 
opportunity to make informed decisions concerning financing alternatives when defendants 
breached their fiduciary duties of full disclosure and informed consent in June 1986. Had 
plaintiffs known of defendants' numerous conflicting interests and the facts and consequences 
of those conflicts, they would have pursued a different course of action. Because of such 
breaches, plaintiffs were placed in a position in which they had no opportunity to pursue other 
financing and in which defendants and their other clients could take advantage of plaintiffs. 
Each subsequent event and each subsequent breach by defendants was a cumulative, likely and 
foreseeable result of defendants' breaches in June 1986. 
Also, because defendants' fiduciary breaches prevented plaintiffs from following a 
different course to obtain financing, it is irrelevant whether plaintiffs would have achieved a 
better result. Under such circumstances, the law requires only that plaintiffs show that 
defendants' conduct was a "substantial factor" in leading plaintiffs to pursue the course they 
13Even if the district court's "proximate cause" analysis is applied, the court erred in granting summary judgment 
in the face of disputed issues of fact. In its oral ruling, the court specifically noted that it was resolving disputed issues 
of fact. For example: 
Also, I find that plaintiffs were represented by independent counsel during the critical time. The court 
recognizes a dispute as to this finding, but is convinced upon the record before me that the logical 
conclusion is that of representation by the law firm of Dow, Lohnes, et al. 
Also, 
Those factors and other contained in the exhibits and the arguments lead me to the conclusion that on 
its face, the CPL Proposal would not have been a better business result for plaintiffs, absent the legal 
malpractice of the defendants. 
Also, 
It is the finding that even given the breach of duty, the plaintiffs have not shown the malpractice of 
defendants caused plaintiffs' injuries, by use or abuse of confidential information gained by defendants 
in the representations of plaintiffs. 
(Appendix, Exhibit 2, pp. 6-9.) 
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followed and such course led to plaintiffs' loss. In short, plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit 
of their bargain which they lost as a result of defendants' breaches. The court, however, 
rejected plaintiffs' causation standard and erroneously applied a standard applicable to 
malpractice claims based on negligence, and held that plaintiffs must prove a "reasonable 
likelihood" that they would have achieved a better business result absent defendants' conduct. 
Even under that standard, plaintiffs would prevail on the facts. 
The court further erred when it weighed the evidence under the erroneous causation 
standard it did apply. That error was compounded when the court weighed the evidence within 
the defective framework proposed by defendants. The court ignored the critical facts that once 
defendants breached their duties of full disclosure in June 1986, those breaches set in motion a 
series of foreseeable events over which plaintiffs had no control. Because of defendants' 
breaches, plaintiffs were vulnerable to whatever Northstar and Allstate, with defendants' 
assistance, chose to do. The focus here is not on who made decisions to force the will of 
Northstar and Allstate on plaintiffs, or whether plaintiffs retained other counsel in an attempt to 
resist such decisions, but whether defendants' deliberate breaches of their duties of full 
disclosure, loyalty and informed consent created the circumstances in which plaintiffs' 
subsequent vulnerabilities were exploited. The answer to that question requires the jury, not the 
court, to consider and weigh all relevant facts. The summary judgment, therefore, should be 
reversed. 
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X. ARGUMENT 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD. 
The summary judgment standard requires the trial court to 
liberally construe the evidence and all inferences that may be reasonably drawn 
from the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion. . . . "The trial 
court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility" . . . . [A] court should not 
make findings of fact. . . . 
Dubois v. Grand Central. 872 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The Supreme Court 
recently emphasized: 
[A] trial court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be 
whether material issues of fact exist. . . . 
"P]t only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the 
other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact." 
Draper City v. Bernardo. 256 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 25 (Utah January 19, 1995). The summary 
judgment here violates these standards. 
B. UNDER THE PROPHYLACTIC STANDARD OF CAUSATION 
APPLICABLE TO BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CASES. AND 
VIEWING THE FACTS AND INFERENCES FROM THE FACTS IN 
THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFFS. MATERIAL 
FACT ISSUES PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.14 
The legal standard of causation in a client's claim against an attorney for intentional 
breach of fiduciary duties is a question of first impression in this jurisdiction. For summary 
judgment purposes, defendants conceded they owed plaintiffs fiduciary duties which they 
14This issue was raised, inter alia, at R 3365-67, 3937-39, 4007-08, 4016-29, 7142-57, 12725, 12729-30, 12736-39, 
12740-53, 12754-55, 12757-59, 12763-67, 12783-84, 12786-88, and ruled upon by the court at R 12803-05, 12376-77. 
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breached.15 Defendants argued that plaintiffs must prove that "but for" defendants' conduct 
in breaching their fiduciary duties, a "reasonable likelihood" existed that plaintiffs would have 
obtained a better business result. Had plaintiffs sued in negligence, that causation standard 
would be correct. A different causation standard applies in claims for breach of fiduciary duty. 
1. Fiduciary Duty. Fiduciary obligations set a standard of "conduct," as 
distinguished from the standard of "care." Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice § 11.1 (3d ed. 
1989). While the law of fiduciary duty involves proof of elements of duty, breach, causation 
and damages, courts regard as proof of these elements a different quality of evidence than in 
negligence claims.16 The distinguishing purpose of the remedy in a breach of fiduciary duty 
case is to "remove all incentive to breach—not simply to compensate for damages in the event 
of a breach." ABKCO Music. Inc. v. Harrisongs Music. Ltd.. 722 F.2d 988, 995-96 (2nd Cir. 
1983). 
Attorney-client relationships are "confidential" within the meaning of fiduciary law. 
Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1200-02 (Utah 1985); cf Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). Legally and ethically, attorneys must represent clients with 
undivided loyalty, disclose fully and fairly any matters materially bearing upon their 
representation of the client's interests, preserve client confidences, and take no advantage 
whatsoever of their position of trust and confidence for themselves or third parties. Mallen & 
Smith, at 631 (citing Smoot v. Lund. 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962)). 
The trial court characterized the defendants' conduct as "outrageous and egregious behavior." (R 12805.) 
16Negligence claims are based on standards of care. Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988); Harline 
v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). An attorney must exercise reasonable care in handling the client's 
matters. Reasonable care is based on standards of competence and diligence in the profession. Id. at 599-600 
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In Smoot v. Lund. 13 Utah 2d 266, 369 P.2d 933, 936 (1962), the Court said the 
fiduciary duty is "of the highest order and he must not represent interests adverse to those of the 
client. . . . He is not permitted to take advantage of his position or superior knowledge . . . nor 
to conceal facts or law." Likewise, the relationship prohibits an attorney from securing any 
advantage, whether from or of the client. Omega Inv. Co. v. Woolley. 72 Utah 474, 271 P. 
797 (1928). Affirming these concepts in recent years, the Court explained that "[t]he law has 
long recognized that an attorney is held to the highest duty of fidelity, honor, fair dealing and 
full disclosure to a client." Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Utah 1985). The 
Court characterized the duties at page 1204: 
The practice of law is a profession whose members are granted a special privilege 
of holding themselves out as having the education, the skills and the integrity to 
give help and guidance to others in their affairs. . . . 
This includes that the attorney will become unreservedly identified with his 
client's interests and protect his rights. It means not only in dealing with the 
client's adversary, but also that the attorney will adhere to the ideals of honesty 
and fidelity with the client himself; and that he will not use his position to take 
any unfair advantage of the special confidence which the client is entitled to 
repose in him. 
Washington D.C. law recognizes identical duties and standards, tying them directly to 
professional standards. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gardner. 798 F. Supp. 790, 797 (D.D.C. 
1992). In Avianca. Inc. v. Corriea. 705 F. Supp. 666, 679-80 (D.D.C. 1989), the court 
explained: 
[When a conflict of interest exists, the] attorney [must] first affirmatively make 
a full disclosure "of all the facts, legal implications, possible effects, and other 
circumstances relating to the proposed representation," and thereafter gains the 
informed consent of his client. . . . ("'Full disclosure' includes a clear 
explanation of the differing interests involved . . . and the advantage of seeking 
independent legal advice. It also requires a detailed explanation of the risks and 
disadvantages to the client . . . including any liabilities that will or may 
foreseeably accrue to him.") 
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The attorney has the burden to establish that "he made a full, affirmative disclosure and acted 
with the utmost good faith." Id. at 680.17 Full disclosure is required so that clients have full 
information upon which to base their decisions in every case involving conflicting interests. 
Matter of James. 452 A.2d 163, 167 (D.C. App. 1982). 
2. Breach.18 An attorney cannot represent two adverse clients 
simultaneously unless he satisfies two requirements, one of which is obtaining the clients' 
informed consent. MarguUes, 696 P.2d at 1203-04. Representing one client against another 
client, absent proper consent and disclosure, constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, violating 
most, if not all, legal duties recognized under the relationship. Lack of disclosure and informed 
consent deprives the client of the opportunity to make free decisions concerning the course of 
action it will pursue. 
Breach of an attorney's fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty also occurs when the attorney 
obtains a personal advantage or an advantage for others, whether consisting of an acquisition 
from the client or usurpation of an interest in or (business) opportunity concerning the subject 
matter of retention, or when any circumstances exist which create adversity to the client's 
interest. Mallen & Smith, §§ 11.1, 11.18, 11.19, 11.20, 11.23, and 12.119; Avianca. Inc. v. 
Cornea, 705 F. Supp. 666, 681 (D.D.C. 1989). 
17Lawyers have created a sanctuary by crafting rules concerning loyalty and confidentiality, and they have benefitted 
from these ethics-imposed privileges. Lawyers simply cannot have it both ways. They must choose between serving 
their clients or serving themselves. By stepping into the role, they make the choice. Society is best served by a system 
that protects and enhances client trust in attorneys and preserves full and frank communication. 
18Breach is "constructive fraud" which requires no proof of intent, but only breach of the obligations implicit in the 
relationship. Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). Constructive fraud has the same legal consequence 
as actual fraud. Faulkenberry v. Kansas City Southern Rv. Co., 602 P.2d 203, 206 (Okl. 1979). 
In the context of a "confidential" relationship, "any transaction that benefits the party in whom trust is reposed is 
presumed to have been unfair and to have resulted from undue influence and fraud." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 
766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
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3. Causation and Damages. "Causation" in a breach of fiduciary duty case 
differs from that in a negligence action. The nature and purpose of the attorney/client 
relationship is to encourage the client to make full confidential disclosures to and rely completely 
on the attorney. This places the attorney in an unusual position of control and power. Breach 
of a client's trust and confidence is devastating, but most often difficult to measure. The breach 
itself may create circumstances which prevent the client from establishing the "reasonable 
likelihood" of a better result. Thus, "[a]n action for breach of fiduciary duty is a prophylactic 
rule intended to remove all incentive to breach—not simply to compensate for damages in the 
event of a breach." ABKCO Music. Inc. v. Harrisongs Music. Ltd.. 722 F.2d at 995-96. 
Strict "but for" causation in claims based on breach of fiduciary duty is conceptually 
inconsistent with the purpose of the remedy. The applicable standard requires plaintiffs to show 
only that the course of action they took resulted in loss, and that defendants' breaches were "a 
substantial factor" in leading plaintiffs to take that course of action. Milbank. Tweed. Hadley 
& McClov v. Boon. 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
These are not new concepts. Restatement (Second) of Agency. §§ 387-407. Cases 
involving usurpation of business opportunities, insider trading, and other abuses of positions of 
trust and confidence are myriad. For example, in Diamond v. Oreamuno. 24 N. Y.2d 494, 498, 
301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1969), a coiporate fiduciary who was entrusted 
with inside information sold stock which resulted in injury to the stock purchaser but not to the 
corporation. The court permitted the corporation's action for breach of fiduciary duty and 
damages, explaining: 
[T]he function of such an action, unlike an ordinary tort or contract case, is not 
merely to compensate the plaintiff for wrongs committed by the defendant but, 
as this court declared many years ago "to prevent them, by removing from agents 
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and trustees all inducement to attempt dealing for their own benefit in matters 
which they have undertaken for others, or to which their agency or trust relates." 
Fiduciary principles apply with greater force in the lawyer/client relationship. In 
Milbank. Tweed. Hadley & McClov. v. Boon. 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994), for example, the 
court held that the law firm had breached its duties to a client by representing her former agent 
against her. The client sued Milbank for breach of fiduciary duties, and the jury awarded 
$2 million, the difference between what the client, had agreed to pay for certain assets and the 
selling price of those assets to her former agent, another client of the firm. Id. at 542. 
On appeal, Milbank's principal defense, like the defense asserted by the Wiley Firm 
herein, was proximate cause-its conduct, regardless of its egregiousness, made no difference 
in the outcome. Id. The Second Circuit rejected that argument, beginning with a discussion of 
ABKCO Music. Inc. v. Harrisongs Music. Ltd.. 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983), a case involving 
a fiduciary relationship but not that of attorney-client. In ABKCO. certain of the Beatles' 
business affairs, including those of George Harrison, had been handled by ABKCO and Klein, 
its president. Harrison Interests claimed that Klein had later interfered with settlement negotia-
tions between Harrison Interests and another company in a dispute. As the Milbank court 
explained: 
Klein's status as former business manager added special credibility to the advice 
and information that he gave to the hostile company, making it less willing to 
settle with Harrison Interests. . . . Although it was unclear whether Harrison 
Interests would have settled with the company without ABKCO's interference, 
Klein's intrusion made the settlement less likely. 
Id., 13 F.3d at 543. The Milbank Court observed at page 543: 
"[A]n action for breach of fiduciary duty is a prophylactic rule intended to 
remove all incentive to breach-not simply to compensate for damages in the 
event of a breach." . . . Having found that ABKCO's conduct constituted a 
breach of fiduciary duty, "the district judge was not required to find a 'but for' 
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relationship between ABKCO's conduct and the lack of success of Harrison 
Interests' settlement efforts." 
Applying these principles to an attorney's breach, the court stated at pages 543-44: 
[I]n ABKCO . . . we indicated that the situation was similar, "although not 
wholly analogous" to side-switching cases involving attorneys and their former 
clients. . . . There is an even more compelling reason to apply a prophylactic rule 
to remove the incentive to breach when the fiduciary relationship is that of an 
attorney and former client because of the attorney's unique position of trust and 
confidence. Furthermore, breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context 
comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent 
requirements of causation and damages. . . . 
Milbank promised in writing not to represent Chan or Mrs. Leo after Chan's 
agency was terminated. Milbank then turned around, without consent, to pursue 
on behalf of Chan an amendment to the same transaction that it had previously 
negotiated on behalf of Mrs. Leo. . . . This constitutes a serious breach of 
fiduciary duty where a "prophylactic rule" should apply; Mrs. Leo does not have 
to show strict "but for" causation or proximate cause. . . . She has to show 
[only] that Milbank's representation of Chan was at least a substantial factor in 
preventing her from acquiring the second stage assets. . . . Milbank cannot enjoy 
impunity by showing that Mrs. Leo's loss might have resulted from other possible 
causes. . . . 
We need not and cannot determine whether or not Mrs. Leo would have 
successfully completed the transaction without Milbank's conduct against her 
interests. 
Moreover, where an attorney intentionally breaches his fiduciary duties to his client, 
establishing the element of reliance is sufficient to show causation. See Alta Health Strategies, 
Inc. v. Kennedy. 790 F. Supp. 1085, 1097 (D. Utah 1992). This principle is illustrated in the 
analogous fraud context. If the subordinate party takes or fails to take some course of action 
in reliance on the acts or omissions of the dominant party and the subordinate party incurs loss, 
causation exists, even though he may or may not have incurred a similar loss elsewhere absent 
the fraud. To prevail, the subordinate party has no onus to prove he would have done better 
absent the fraud, another party would not have committed the same fraud against him, or some 
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other event would not have caused a similar loss.20 As explained in Lochhead v. Alacano, 697 
F. Supp. 406, 419 (D. Utah 1988): 
[Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot successfully claim he relied upon any 
misrepresentations or omissions and that, therefore, the causal connection for his 
state claim of common law fraud is missing. Reliance and causation can be very 
closely related. !f[U]se of the concept of reliance as a means of finding a 
connection introduces the factor of causation. . . . " Plaintiff claims that if he had 
not relied on the misrepresentations and omissions in corporate records and 
merger documents, he could have taken steps to protect his legal rights. . . . 
Plaintiff could have exercised his rights to persuade others to his view, to vote 
against the merger transaction, or to seek an appraisal. . . . Thus, plaintiff may 
have been able to interrupt the causal cycle if any irregularities had been 
disclosed. 
"Reliance," as a principle of causation, was illustrated in Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 
F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). There the attorney failed to advise his client of facts which 
raised questions concerning the advisability of making a loan. The court explained at pages 39-
If an attorney negligently or willfully withholds from his client information 
material to the client's decision to pursue a given course of action, or to abstain 
therefrom, then the attorney is liable for the client's losses suffered as a result of 
action taken without benefit of the undisclosed material facts. . . . 
It is enough to say that a reasonable man, advised by his attorney that a 
corporation to which he was contemplating a substantial loan was without 
sufficient income to repay and otherwise in precarious financial condition, 
probably would not have made the loan. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit in Spector further explained this causal relationship: 
The essential issue is whether the conduct of the defendant was a material element 
or a substantial factor in bringing about the loss. . . . 
"It is not enough that the defendant, in an effort to break the chain 
of causation, should prove that plaintiff's injury might have 
resulted from other possible causes, nor is it required of the 
It is no defense to a breach of fiduciary claim that defendants' conduct, with all appropriate disclosures, would 
otherwise have been a reasonable business judgment. Fogel v. Chestnutt. 533 F.2d 731, 750 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
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plaintiff that he eliminate by his proof all other possible causes." 
Thus Spector, having been led into making the $250,000 in loans without being 
advised of material facts . . . was placed in the position of seeing his money go 
down the drain . . . Mermelstein, by placing his client in this precarious position, 
was a substantial factor in bringing about Spector's loss . . . . 
Spector v. Mermelstein. 485 F.2d 474, 480-81 (2nd Cir. 1973). 
Under the principles enunciated above, material fact issues exist on whether defendants' 
conduct was a "substantial factor" in bringing about plaintiffs' losses. Had defendants not 
breached their fiduciary duties of full disclosure and informed consent in the first instance, the 
MWTC Partners could have evaluated their position "in light of defendants' conflicting interests" 
and made an informed decision concerning how to proceed and protect their interests. They 
would have pursued a different course of action. 
Defendants claim that plaintiffs' losses resulted, in any event, from other circumstances 
or causes. Defendants cannot enjoy impunity by showing that plaintiffs' losses might have 
resulted from other possible causes. Indeed, 
[i]f proximate cause is ultimately a question of fairness and policy, imposing 
liability on these facts is both fair and good policy. Lawyers who fail to inform 
clients of their own interests, fail to advise clients to seek other counsel, 
unabashedly sell their clients the notion that an investment with them or their 
colleagues is a good and safe one, and use their clients as sources of investment 
funds [or television licensing opportunity], must accept responsibility for the 
outcome. Lawyers may not burrow their way into their clients' confidences and 
then exploit those confidences for their own ends. 
Profit Sharing Trust for Marprowear Corp. v. Lampf Lipkind. Prupis. Petigrow & Labue, 267 
N.J. 174, 630 A.2d 1191, 1203 (1993) (emphasis supplied). In any event, it is a fact question. 
Thus, plaintiffs need only show that (a) they relied upon defendants who undertook to 
represent them with undivided loyalty, (b) defendants' breaches were a substantial factor in 
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leading plaintiffs to pursue the course of action they took, and (c) such course of action resulted 
in a loss. At the very least, disputed issues of material fact exist as to each of these matters. 
The standard does not require plaintiffs to show a reasonable likelihood of a better business 
result. Any result other than what actually occurred is irrelevant to the inquiry. It was error 
for the trial court to apply a negligence causation standard and to grant summary judgment. 
C. EVEN UNDER THE "REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD" STANDARD. 
AND VIEWING THE FACTS AND INFERENCES FROM THE FACTS 
IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFFS. MATERIAL 
FACT ISSUES PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.21 
In malpractice claims based on negligence, Utah Courts require proof that "but for" the 
attorney's negligence, there was a "reasonable likelihood" the outcome of the matter as to which 
the attorney was negligent would have been better. Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d 887, 889-90 
(Utah 1988). Harline v. Barker. 854 P.2d 595, 600 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The client must 
show that if the attorney had adhered to the ordinary standards of professional competence and 
had done the act he failed to do or not done the act complained about, the client would have 
benefited") (emphasis added).22 The trial court applied this standard. Plaintiffs' burden, at 
most, was to present a material fact question concerning the matter, under a preponderance 
standard.23 
21This issue was raised, inter alia, at R 3365-87, 3938-42,4016-29, 7142-57,12736-39, 12740-53,12754-55, 12757-
59, 12763-68, 12776-88, and ruled upon by the court at R 12803-07, 12376-77. 
By its terms, this proximate cause analysis applies to standards of care (competence), as distinguished from 
standards of conduct (loyalty and confidentiality). 
23 
"Reasonable likelihood," in this specific context, has not been defined by Utah appeals courts. In Harline, this 
Court suggested it was based on whether a reasonable juror could conclude that but for the act or omission, the client 
would have been "helped." Id. at 601. "Reasonable likelihood" of ultimate success does not mean "that factually there 
be absolute assurance of ultimate success, but only that there be some reasonable hope." Stern v. Day, 1989 Del. Ch. 
Lexis 89, 96 (August 3, 1989). Cases in the criminal context give additional guidance. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 
919 (Utah 1987), for example, suggests a standard akin to "may have made a difference in the outcome." 
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The trial court ruled as a matter of law that but for defendants' conduct there was no 
"reasonable likelihood" of a better business result. This ruling was erroneous in several 
respects. First, the court ignored critical facts in the record, some of which are undisputed. 
Second, the trial court weighed evidence and drew inferences in favor of defendants rather than 
in favor of the non-moving parties. Finally, in practical effect and based on the record before 
it, the trial court elevated the standard of "reasonable likelihood" to one of near certainty. "But 
for" defendants' breaches of their fiduciary duties, under the "reasonable likelihood" standard, 
there would have been a better business result than what occurred. At the least, genuine issues 
of material fact exist on the question, precluding summary judgment. 
Discussion concerning the "reasonable likelihood" of a better business result is fact-
intensive. Before examining what the business result might reasonably have been "but for" 
defendants' breaches, and to draw the proper comparison, the Court first must consider what the 
actual business result was. 
ACTUAL BUSINESS RESULT: Defendants' breaches of their duties of full disclosure 
and informed consent in June 1986, and the chain of subsequent breaches and events resulted 
in plaintiffs' (a) entire loss of the license and all financial interest in the station, (b) loss of their 
capital contributions, (c) loss of employment benefits and opportunities, and (d) $2 million 
potential indebtedness based on the "cash call." In effect, plaintiffs lost the benefit of their 
bargain with Northstar. Is there evidence in the record upon which a fact finder could conclude 
that "but for" defendants' breaches, a "reasonable likelihood" exists that plaintiffs would have 
experienced a better result? Doing nothing but keeping their former jobs, plaintiffs would have 
experienced a better business result. 
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The facts in the record, and the reasonable inferences from those facts, considered in the 
light most favorable to plaintiffs, establish a "reasonable likelihood" that plaintiffs would have 
achieved a better business result but for defendants' breaches of their fiduciary duties of full 
disclosure, informed consent and loyalty. 
NORTHSTAR: Had defendants not breached their fiduciary duties and created the 
conditions in which Northstar/Allstate could take advantage of plaintiffs' vulnerabilities, a jury 
could conclude that a "reasonable likelihood" existed that Northstar/Allstate could have been 
compelled to follow through with their original $10 million commitment. A jury could conclude 
that had the Wiley Firm represented plaintiffs faithfully and zealously in their dealings with 
Northstar, the Firm necessarily would have taken affirmative steps to safeguard plaintiffs' 
interests and that Northstar/Allstate would have honored their commitment. Instead, having 
themselves created the very conditions for the squeeze down, the Wiley Firm then helped 
Northstar/Allstate change the commitment and force the changes on plaintiffs. Northstar's own 
projections establish what the result would have otherwise been.24 Under those projections, 
the result clearly would have been better than the losses and injury plaintiffs incurred. 
CPL: A genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether plaintiffs would have 
achieved a better business result had they accepted the CPL financing offer. Had defendants, 
in June 1986, disclosed to plaintiffs the conflicting representations and all facts and effects of 
such representations on plaintiffs' interests, plaintiffs would have altered their course of action 
by accepting the CPL offer or by seeking financing from other sources. 
Under Northstar's projections, plaintiffs' interest in the station would have had a value of between $13 million to 
$24.6 million by the end of 1991. (R 7059.) 
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CPL had agreed to put up $10 million plus a $1 million contingency "to permit MWTC 
to construct, own and operate [the station]." (R 7091-94.) Had Mr. Wood not advised the MWTC 
Partners to take the Northstar commitment and to turn down CPL, plaintiffs would have had a 
40% interest in the venture instead of the 38% interest they ultimately acquired. (R 9829-34,4038, 
6530, 6554.) In addition, CPL did not require that control of the venture be given to CPL. (R 
7091-94.) Even if plaintiffs had received only $8 million, which was sufficient to buy out the 
competing permit applicants and put Channel 13 into operation, the station would have succeeded 
in direct competition with Channel 20. The study prepared by plaintiffs' expert demonstrates 
that under such circumstances, plaintiffs' interest in the station would be approximately $20 
million. Thus, the trial court erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that but for defendants' 
conduct, plaintiffs could not have achieved a better business result. Material issues of fact exist 
in this regard. 
OTHER FINANCING: Finally, "but for" defendants' breaches of fiduciary duties of full 
disclosure in June 1986, plaintiffs could have settled with the other applicants or sought 
financing elsewhere. They testified they would have done so had they known of defendants' 
conflicting interests and the facts relating to those conflicts. Mr. Wood stated that the station 
was of "immense value." He advised plaintiffs that industry conditions for independent stations 
were excellent and he enclosed illustrations of the favorable market conditions. Two investors 
eagerly stepped forward, making commitments of $10 million and $11 million, respectively.25 
They projected a successful and lucrative venture based on their respective commitments. Barry 
It also came out that at one point Adams was interested in expanding its holdings of communication properties, 
which interest was directly adverse to that of Northstar. Absent the Wiley Firm's conflicting representations of 
Northstar, Adams and MWTC, MWTC could have been promptly and properly advised of Adams' interest and entered 
arms-length negotiations. 
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Wood advised plaintiffs to go with Northstar instead of CPL. Plaintiffs relied on this advice. 
Mr. Wood informed CPL's representatives of that decision. At that point, plaintiffs were 
unaware of defendants' numerous conflicts of interest and the facts and consequences of those 
conflicts. In reliance on defendants, therefore, plaintiffs did not pursue, nor with Northstar's 
$10 million commitment did they have a reason to pursue, other financing alternatives. 
Based upon these facts, a fact finder could reasonably conclude that "but for" defendants' 
breaches in June 1986, there was a "reasonable likelihood" that plaintiffs could have obtained 
the $8 million to buy out the other applicants and put the station into operation. Had they been 
able to do so in the summer and fall of 1986, the station would have succeeded and plaintiffs 
had a "reasonable likelihood" of achieving a better business result. 
D. DEFENDANTS CANNOT PASS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR 
BREACHES TO THEIR OTHER CLIENTS: VIEWING THE FACTS 
AND INFERENCES FROM THE FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFFS. MATERIAL FACT QUESTIONS 
EXIST ON WHETHER DEFENDANTS' BREACHES CAUSED 
PLAINTIFFS INJURIES. PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.26 
The classic argument is made repeatedly by attorneys: "I am not the client, and I cannot 
be blamed for the conduct of my client if it injures someone with whom my client transacts." 
This argument, which the trial court accepted below, is wholly beside the point. Lawyers 
usually are not their own clients and generally do not simultaneously represent adverse interests. 
If an attorney owes no fiduciary duty to the person with whom his client transacts business or 
ventures, he generally cannot be found to have breached a duty to that non-client. 
The trial court's ruling, however, overlooks the fact that defendants owed fiduciary duties 
to the persons with whom Northstar transacted business. Defendants' June 1986 breaches set 
26This issue was raised, inter alia, at R 3368, 3376-83, 3938-42, 4008-09, 7138-42, 12727-29, 12750-53, 12764-72, 
12782-88, 12788-90, and ruled upon by the court at R 12805-06, 12377. 
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in motion a chain of events in which Northstar/Allstate, with the assistance of the Wiley Firm 
as their attorneys, forced their decisions on plaintiffs. Absent defendants' breaches of full 
disclosure and consent in June 1986, none of the events in that chain, including the decisions 
of Northstar/Allstate, could have occurred. Thus, it is not Northstar's conduct that is scrutinized 
or is even necessarily blameworthy, but the attorney's breaches. The attorney's conduct 
becomes the centerpiece of the controversy. The degree of incestuousness of defendants' 
relationships with their more prestigious clients, and their personal interest in the outcome, are 
relevant insofar as they expose the degree of the defendants' breaches of the fiduciary duties they 
owed the plaintiffs. 
In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co.. 77B.R. 128 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987), addresses 
the fallacy of defendants' argument and the trial court's summary judgment. There the attorney 
had represented both the debtor, Telecasting, and a creditor interest in negotiating a settlement 
that was ultimately disadvantageous to the debtor. The attorney conceded the malpractice and 
conflicts of interest, but contended that the breaches of duties were not the cause in fact nor the 
proximate cause of Telecasting's harm. He argued that "but for" his malpractice, the creditor 
client would have found an alternative method to accomplish the same end. The court responded: 
Arguing illusory occurrences as an attempt to sidestep the facts as they exist, is 
untenable. . . . It is not enough that the defendant, in an effort to break the chain 
of causation, should prove that plaintiff's injury might have resulted from other 
possible causes. 
Id. at 171-72. 
Like defendants herein, the attorney in Overmyer argued that it was not his conduct, but 
that of his unscrupulous other client, that proximately caused the loss. The court rejected that 
argument, stating at page 172: 
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[E]ven if it was conceded that the actions of Overmyer were an independent and 
intervening force, [the attorney] could not be insulated since he could, or should 
have, foreseen the risk that Overmyer would attempt to defraud the Telecasting 
bankruptcy estate that [the attorney] represented. . . . Nothing indicates [the 
attorney] could not anticipate or foresee the actions by Overmyer. . . . 
Moreover, this Court has determined that [the attorney] affirmatively acted to 
preserve Overmyer's interest in the . . . settlement, undercutting any realistic 
notion that [the attorney] could not foresee Overmyer's continued transgressions 
with respect to the Telecasting estate. 
It is not a valid argument that Overmyer committed the frauds and took advantage 
of the settlement provisions offered by [the attorney], since [the attorney] had the 
duty to protect the creditors' interests against just the type of activities for which 
he is now found liable. 
Similarly, the Court in Johnson v. Miller. 596 F. Supp. 768, 773 (D. Colo. 1989), 
enunciated the significance of the attorney's role in affirmatively protecting a client's interest 
by anticipating the illicit plans of others: 
Miller argues that any dissipation of Fund assets were [sic] caused by the actions 
of Chilcott and did not in any way involve Miller's legal representation. Thus, 
Miller claims that Chilcott's actions were superseding causes of the Fund's 
injuries. As an attorney, Miller's duty to his client may have entailed anticipating 
Chilcott's illicit plans and giving the Fund adequate warnings of Chilcott's actions 
or structuring the legal activities of the Fund in such a way as to prevent 
Chilcott's actions from dissipating the Fund's resources. Miller fails to 
demonstrate that his actions were free from causing the plaintiff's loss so as to 
sustain a motion for summary judgment.27 
Despite the facts showing that Mr. Wiley counseled and, as a director, was actually 
involved in the corporate decisions that damaged plaintiffs, defendants argued that had 
Mr. Wiley "vanished" from the decision-making bodies of clients whose interests were adverse 
27 Because clients typically seek the attorney's advice and counsel in matters relating to third parties, the attorney 
who breaches his fiduciary duty to one client simply cannot place the blame on another client for the first client's 
injury, especially when the attorney creates the circumstances and vulnerabilities which enable the second client to do 
what he did. That, however, is what defendants attempt to do here. 
The facts here are significantly more egregious than those in Overmyer because of defendants' devastating 
and continuing breaches. Mr. Wiley did not simply represent separate clients in a conflicting situation, as the 
attorney did in Overmyer. He breached his duties in other ways. He engaged in self-dealing and actively promoted 
the interests of his wealthier clients. 
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to those of plaintiffs, the result would have been the same. He would have been outvoted had 
he dissented from what the other directors wanted to do. This argument ignores the true nature 
of decision-making on such boards where people are free to speak and persuade. It ignores Mr. 
Wiley's stature and influence, as well as the clear facts which show that Mr. Wiley and his Firm 
advised Northstar on the very matters at issue, and then, as a director, Mr. Wiley voted in favor 
of specific actions directed against plaintiffs. 
It also ignores the fact that Mr. Wiley had affirmative duties to advance and protect the 
interests of his first clients, not simply sit passively while another client made decisions and took 
advantage of the first client. Mr. Wiley did not do so. Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to plaintiffs, therefore, material fact issues exist on whether defendants' breaches 
caused plaintiffs' injuries, precluding summary judgment. 
E. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OTHERS' CONDUCT MITIGATED 
THE EFFECT OF DEFENDANTS' BREACHES IS IRRELEVANT: 
VIEWING THE FACTS AND INFERENCES FROM THE FACTS IN 
THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFFS. MATERIAL 
FACT QUESTIONS EXIST ON WHETHER DEFENDANTS' 
BREACHES CAUSED PLAINTIFFS INJURIES. PRECLUDING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.28 
Defendants argued that despite their fiduciary breaches, plaintiffs were represented at 
critical stages by separate counsel, and defendants' breaches were thus superseded or ameliorated 
by others' conduct. Plaintiffs disputed both factual assertions, and although the trial court 
expressly recognized the factual disputes, it weighed the facts and took the matter from the jury. 
28This issue was raised, inter alia, at R 3370-76, 4008-11, 7160-65, 12732-36, 12775, 12777-78, 12780, and ruled 
upon by the court at R 12805, 12376. 
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1. MATERIAL FACT ISSUES EXIST ON WHETHER PLAIN-
TIFFS WERE REPRESENTED BY SEPARATE COUNSEL AT 
CRITICAL TIMES. 
The question of what others may have done in an effort to ameliorate the effects of 
defendants' breaches is irrelevant to the initial proximate cause inquiry. However, to the extent 
the inquiry could be construed to present a question of superseding cause, the inquiry precludes 
summary judgment. The issue of whether plaintiffs were represented by separate counsel at 
critical times is fact-intensive. 
The Wiley Firm had represented MWTC and its partners' exclusive interests over five 
years before Northstar came onto the scene. The Wiley Firm continued to represent plaintiffs' 
interests, uninterrupted, throughout 1986. The type and character of the services for plaintiffs 
never changed prior to the November 1986 squeeze-down, and there was no reason for plaintiffs 
to believe that the representation was any different than it had previously been. 
During the mid-November 1986 squeeze-down, Mr. Wood called three of the plaintiffs, 
his Utah clients, and advised and counseled them on legal matters relating to events taking place 
in Washington, D.C. During and after the squeeze-down, Mr. Wood challenged attorneys in 
his firm concerning the fact that MWTC and its partners were clients of the Wiley Firm, that 
Northstar's commitment of $10 million had been reduced to less than $7 million at the 
November meetings, and that defendants owed duties to MWTC and its partners as clients of 
the Wiley Firm. He risked his employment due to what he perceived as the Firm's violations 
of professional duties to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs testified that Mr. Wood and the Wiley Firm were 
their attorneys and that plaintiffs relied on them as their attorneys at all critical stages. That 
representation remained uninterrupted. 
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Mr. Hardy came onto the scene sometime in the summer of 1986 when the Foulger 
Family sought his services as a financial advisor in reviewing information and projections given 
to MWTC by Mr. Wood. Although the MWTC Partners later learned he was an attorney, they 
understood he was a close friend of the Foulgers and was serving as a financial advisor to them. 
Plaintiffs testified Mr. Hardy was not their attorney until long after the squeeze-down. There 
are disputed issues of fact regarding these matters. It was improper for the trial court to weigh 
the facts and rule as a matter of law that Mr. Hardy was plaintiffs' lawyer at critical times.29 
2. EVEN ASSUMING PLAINTIFFS WERE REPRESENTED AT 
CRITICAL TIMES. A FACT QUESTION EXISTS ON 
WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT REPRESENTATION MADE 
ANY DIFFERENCE. 
Defendants' argument is akin to claiming that Mr. Hardy's involvement constituted an 
independent intervening cause. An intervening cause is an independent event, not reasonably 
foreseeable, that completely breaks the connection between the defendants' fault and the 
plaintiffs' injury. Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 820 P.2d482 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(and cases cited therein). Even assuming that Mr. Hardy somehow represented plaintiffs and 
worked to mitigate the effects of defendants' breaches, defendants remain liable for the effects 
of their breaches. There is at the very least a question of fact concerning whether subsequent 
representation of plaintiffs by other attorneys altered or could have undone the sequence of 
events set in motion by defendants' breaches in June 1986. 
In order for a cause to supersede the attorney's breaches, (a) the superseding cause must 
occur after the original fault, (b) it must not be the consequence of the attorney's fault, (c) it 
29There is no showing whatever that Mr. Hardy ever advised plaintiffs regarding the nature and extent of defendants' 
numerous conflicts of interest and the inherent risks, or even that he was aware of the nature, extent and risks of such 
conflicts. There is also no evidence of a retainer agreement or engagement letter. 
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must bring about a result that would not otherwise have followed from the original fault, and 
(d) it must not be reasonably foreseeable. E.g.. Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett 490 N.W.2d 108 
(Minn. 1992); Gibralter Savings v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.. 907 F.2d 844, 848 (8th 
Cir. 1990). As a matter of law, defendants cannot meet (b), (c) or (d). 
Regardless of how defendants attempt to characterize Mr. Hardy's involvement, it lacks 
several characteristics of an intervening cause. First, it was in no way "independent" of 
defendants' breaches. To the extent Mr. Hardy was involved, it was directly because of 
defendants' breaches. Had defendants properly represented plaintiffs' interests, there would have 
been no need for another attorney to attempt to protect their interests. Second, the result of 
defendants' original fault followed despite Mr. Hardy's alleged involvement. Third, the need 
for Mr. Hardy's involvement was a clearly connected and foreseeable result of defendants' 
breaches. Finally no one claims that Mr. Hardy's conduct in attempting to ameliorate the effects 
of defendants' breaches was negligent. Thus, the question of independent intervening cause is 
irrelevant, and defendants must be held liable for the effects of their breaches.30 At the very 
least, there are issues of material fact as to these matters. 
Courts have addressed similar superseding cause arguments in the context of a legal 
malpractice claim. For example, in Ackerman v. Schwartz. 733 F.Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ind. 
1989), certain investors sued attorneys who had written a tax opinion. Defendants contended 
that plaintiffs' injuries were caused by others' diversion of funds and not by their 
misrepresentations or omissions in the opinion. Plaintiffs claimed that absent the diversion of 
funds, they still would have lost. The court explained at pages 1238-39: 
In a long history of cases, Utah appeals courts have recognized the fact-intensive nature of the superseding cause 
inquiry. See Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Harris v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 671 P.2d217 (Utah 1983); Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d363 (Utah 1980). 
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The plaintiffs have presented evidence that tends to show that, even absent the 
diversion of funds, misrepresentations. . . would have produced the same result. 
The plaintiffs can establish a sufficient causal link between the misrepresentations 
or omissions in the opinion letter and the claimed losses if they can show that the 
subject of some of the alleged misrepresentations or omissions might have been 
relevant to the loss. . . . Whether these consequences were known to, or 
foreseeable by, the defendants . . . presents a genuine issue of material fact 
foreclosing summary judgment on causation grounds.31 
Here, with or without Mr. Hardy's involvement, plaintiffs incurred loss as a direct and 
proximate result of defendants' breaches. As plaintiffs' expert Ronald Mallen testified, Mr. 
Hardy's representation of plaintiffs could not have ameliorated the devastating course of events 
created by defendants' initial breaches in June 1986, not to mention the ongoing breaches. 
(R 11743-44,11748,11750-51,11757,11767,11770.) At the very least, a disputed issue of material facts 
exists on this question.32 
F. VIEWING THE FACTS AND INFERENCES FROM THE FACTS IN 
THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFFS. MATERIAL 
FACT QUESTIONS EXIST ON WHETHER DEFENDANTS' 
BREACHED THEIR DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY TO 
PLAINTIFFS.33 
The trial court overlooked the fact that misuse of confidential information was a separate 
breach from defendants' breach of duties of loyalty, full disclosure and informed consent. 
31See also Cline v. Watkins, 135 Cal. Rptr. 838, 66 Cal. App. 3d 174, 176 (1977) (whether substitution of new 
counsel who fails to cure results of first attorney's fault relieves first attorney of liability is at the very least a question 
of fact based on foreseeability of second attorney's failure); cfj. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 
537, 543 (2d Cir. 1994) (retention of new attorneys in an effort to ameliorate the effects of defendants' breach was not 
relevant to the causation inquiry). 
32See also In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 77 B.R. 128 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (discussed above); Johnson 
v. Miller, 596 F. Supp. 768 (D. Colo. 1989) (discussed above); Spector v. Mermelstein, 485 F.2d 474, 480-81 (2nd 
Cir. 1973) (discussed above). 
33This issue was raised, inter aim, at R 3368, 3383-86, 3939, 3944-45,4021-22, 7158-60, 12753-54, and ruled upon 
by the court at R 12804-05, 12376. 
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Liability for breach of the duty of loyalty, including full disclosure, does not depend solely on 
misuse of confidential information. As shown above, once defendants breached their duties of 
loyalty and full disclosure in June 1986, each subsequent breach by defendants, including their 
breach of the duty of confidentiality, was simply part of a chain of events set in motion by 
defendants' earlier breaches of their duties of full disclosure and informed consent. Because of 
the insidiousness of breaches of fiduciary duties, courts, including Washington, D.C. courts, 
recognize the existence of an irrebuttable presumption that counsel received information during 
the first representation that is relevant to the second representation where two related matters 
are handled by the same counsel. Brown v. District of Col. Bd. of Zoning Adj.. 486 A.2d 37, 
42 (D.C. App. 1984). In addition, plaintiffs testified they provided a considerable amount of 
confidential information to the Wiley Firm over a five-year period, and Mr. Wood so 
acknowledged. 
The Wiley Firm admits it owed a duty of confidentiality to plaintiffs. Defendants, of 
course, deny obtaining or using any such information, despite the fact that as attorneys for 
Northstar, Allstate, Farragut, Adams, and MWT, Ltd., the Firm had a duty to obtain and use 
whatever information would be to those clients' advantage.34 
The defendants in ABKCO Music. Inc. v. Harrisongs Music. Ltd.. 722 F.2d 988 (2nd 
Cir. 1988), made similar arguments which the court rejected. The court explained that an agent 
has a duty "not to use confidential knowledge acquired in his employment in competition with 
his principal." Id. at 994. The court explained that the information obtained through the 
In this regard Ronald Mallen stated it was inconceivable that defendants would not use information they had about 
plaintiffs. Failing to do so would be a breach of fiduciary duties to Northstar/Allstate. (R 11735-36.) 
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confidential relationship provides the agent tremendous leverage, not unlike the improper use 
of insider information, in bargaining against his principal: 
To a significant extent, the favorable bargaining position necessarily was achieved 
because Klein, as business manager, had intimate knowledge of the financial 
affairs of his client. Klein himself acknowledged at trial that his offers . . . were 
based, at least in part, on knowledge he had acquired as Harrison's business 
manager. . . . 
We find this case analogous to those "where an employee, with the use of 
information acquired through his former employment relationship, completes, for 
his own benefit, a transaction originally undertaken on the former employer's 
behalf." 
Id. at 994-95. 
As suggested by ABKCO, confidential information is a much broader concept than defen-
dants will admit. It includes more than "secrets" or "confidences." It includes all information 
that the client conveys to the attorney, including inferences the attorney may draw from that 
information. One example is information concerning the financial vulnerability of a client, 
which can be used against the client. In the present case, there are disputed issues of material 
fact, regarding, among other things, whether (a) defendants knew that plaintiffs were unable 
financially to resist the defendants' and their other clients' actions at the squeeze-down and 
subsequently, (b) defendants knew plaintiffs were very concerned about their personal liabilities 
and had no choice but to accede to defendants' and their other clients' actions, and (c) 
defendants, therefore, could and did misuse that confidential information and exploit those 
vulnerabilities. 
The facts also show that defendants obtained client information regarding plaintiffs' 
financial condition, personalities, employment, goals, strategies and business practices not 
available to other parties with whom plaintiffs did business. Indeed, because of their unusual 
-48-
position of trust, the Wiley Firm had the ability to access, use, understand and manipulate 
circumstances and information in a manner beneficial to them and their other clients and 
detrimental to plaintiffs. As plaintiffs' expert Ronald Mallen stated, knowing plaintiffs' 
vulnerabilities, which included their inability to resist defendants' and their other clients' actions, 
gave Northstar/Allstate tremendous leverage for demands. Defendants then misused that 
information and leverage. Regarding the mid-November meetings, Mr. Mallen vividly described 
the significance of such information: 
It goes to what kind of deal they can do. It goes to how you can structure the 
deal to make them vulnerable. It goes to their personalities, how you can 
manipulate them. 
(R 11735.) 
A jury, based on the evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn, could 
reasonably conclude that such information proved invaluable and was misused while dealing 
against plaintiffs on behalf of Northstar and Allstate, and while dictating the changes from the 
earlier Northstar/Allstate commitment. The trial court ignored much of the evidence and 
reasonable inferences of misuse of confidential information, and weighed other evidence 
submitted by defendants in concluding that there was no disputed issue of material fact on the 
question of misuse of confidential information. The summary judgment on this issue, therefore, 
must be reversed. 
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XI. CONCLUSION 
The Order of Summary Judgment must be vacated and the case remanded for trial under 
the appropriate standard of causation. 
DATED this of March, 1995. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By \ K , KL~4-csCt^<--
lon R. Hall 
Reed L. Martineau 
Rex E. Madsen 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JANUARY 7, 1994; A.M. SESSION 
2 THE COURT: This is in the matter Kilpatrick, 
3 et al. vs. Wiley, Rein & Fielding and Richard Wiley, 
4 personally, case number 900901064. Appearances, please. 
5 MR. VAN WAGONER: Richard Van Wagoner for the 
6 plaintiffs. Mr. Madsen, I guess he is in deposition. Mr. 
7 Martineau plans to be here. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Van Wagoner. 
9 MR. BERMAN: Dan Berman and Peggy Tomsic for the 
10 defendant, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Berman and Ms. Tomsic. 
12 Before I begin my remarks on this matter, and 
13 this is for the purpose of stating my ruling on the motion 
14 that I heard yesterday, I want to give just some 
15 observations as to how this lawsuit has progressed before 
16 me. 
17 It is obvious that I was fairly new to the bench 
18 when I was first hit with a barrage of motions in this 
19 matter and I took the opportunity to acquaint myself with 
20 the factual basis for this, as well as some of the legal 
21 issues. This occurred back, I believe, September of '92, 
22 something like that. And in my opinion, this is the kind 
23 of work, the kind of issues and the kind of presentations 
24 that make lawsuits an interesting endeavor, makes my job 
25 interesting. I think both parties have vigorously 
3 
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1 supported their positions, have effectively argued their 
2 positions, worked over holidays, vacations and I only feel 
3 I it is fair the court—if the parties and the attorneys are 
4 going to go the extra mile like that, then the court 
5 obviously is expected and should very well try to 
6 accommodate both parties in reaching a just resolution in 
7 this matter and I attempted to do so. 
8 Although it was very laborious in the amount of 
9 pleadings and memoranda that was supplied to the Court, I 
10 found that it was absolutely necessary that I, at least, 
11 acquaint myself with the very legal issues that were 
12 involved in here and the manner which both sides have 
13 presented them to me. In that regard I appreciate the 
14 efforts by both plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants' 
15 counsel in this matter and the attempt to try to educate 
16 the court as to the issues and procedures involved here. 
17 I just make those statements without any other 
18 indication prior to my ruling in this matter, but I do 
19 thank both sides for the manner which this case has been 
20 presented to me. 
21 As to defendants' renewed motion to dismiss 
22 defendant Richard Wiley personally in this matter, that was 
23 submitted to me on memorandum and very brief argument on 
24 it, accordingly, I am going to deny the motion to dismiss 
25 Richard E. Wiley on the basis as I had denied it before. 
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1 If I am wrong in this matter, at least I am consistently 
2 wrong. That will be the ruling of the court. 
3 Now, as to the dispositive motion for summary 
4 judgment or partial summary judgment on the issue of 
5 causation, there is no question that proximate cause and 
6 legal malpractice actions contains two prongs: 
7 Number 1. It requires that the breach of the 
8 lawyers' duty claim be the Mbut for," that being the direct 
9 and substantial cause of the plaintiffs' injuries and loss. 
10 And it is required that the plaintiffs show in the absence 
11 of the legal malpractice, claimed a "reasonable likelihood" 
12 that the better business or legal result for which 
13 plaintiffs' claimed damages would have been achieved. 
14 Defendants, for the purpose of this motion, 
15 concedes the relationship, a duty and breach of duty. If 
16 this action were solely for the establishment of ethical 
17 violations in legal malpractice, these concessions would 
18 lead to only one conclusion, i.e. the defendants committed 
19 legal malpractice. 
20 However, as previously stated, proximate cause 
21 must be shown to exist. Very simply, defendants say that 
22 even given the legal malpractice, plaintiffs have not and 
23 cannot show a factual and legal nexus between the conceded 
24 actions of defendants and the damages to plaintiffs. 
25 Plaintiffs on the other hand have said that the 
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1 factual concessions by defendants in and of themselves are 
2 sufficient to defeat defendants' motions. It is their 
3 position that given the breach of duty as owed to 
4 plaintiffs, and the fact that plaintiffs suffered economic 
5 injury, the damages were a direct result of the breach. 
6 Plaintiffs further state that "but for" the 
7 initial and continuous breaches of duty, the plaintiffs 
8 would not be in their present situation and would not have 
9 been set upon and taken advantage of by defendants in 
10 defendants' efforts to promote their own selfish interests 
11 I as well as interests of other bigger, wealthier clients at 
12 the expense of plaintiffs. 
13 Plaintiff say that due to the relationship 
14 between plaintiffs and defendants, the defendants became 
15 intimately aware of plaintiffs strengths and most 
16 importantly weaknesses that the defendants exploited. 
17 This vulnerability of plaintiffs has been 
18 generally alleged by the plaintiffs but with no specific 
19 factual references. There has been no factual showing that 
20 any confidential information gained by defendants' 
21 representation of plaintiffs was ever used, misused or 
22 abused. 
23 It is necessary for plaintiffs not only to 
24 dispute but establish a factual basis as to genuine issue 
25 of material fact to defeat defendants' motion. Not used 
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1 pejoratively, but for want of better words, the plaintiffs 
2 appear to bootstrap conceded relationship, duty, and breach 
3 to proximate cause based solely upon the outrageous and 
4 egregious behavior of defendants. This is a legal and 
5 factual leap that the plaintiffs ask me to take to deny 
6 defendants' motion. 
7 It is the finding that even given the breach of 
8 duty, the plaintiffs have not shown the malpractice of 
9 defendants caused plaintiffs' injuries, by use or abuse of 
10 confidential information gained by defendants in the 
11 representations of plaintiffs. 
12 Also, I find that plaintiffs were represented by 
13 independent counsel during the critical time. The court 
14 recognizes a dispute as to this finding but is convinced 
15 upon the record before me that the logical conclusion is 
16 that of representations by the law firm of Dow, Lohnes, 
17 et al. 
18 Even though plaintiffs urge me to examine the 
19 business dealings of business entities involved and find 
20 them to be one and the same as the defendants, the record 
21 is clear in that it is not the case. While there certainly 
22 was representation of the various nonparty business 
23 entities by defendants, the record does not support the 
24 plaintiffs' position that they and the defendants were and 
25 are one and the same. Even assuming that the first prong 
7 
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1 of proximate cause has been established or controverted to 
2 the extent of denying defendants' motion# the "reasonable 
3 likelihood" component must be analyzed. 
4 "Reasonable likelihood" is a somewhat 
5 self-defining term that does not include conjecture and/or 
6 speculation. Plaintiffs have said that if there was full 
7 disclosure by defendants of conflict, they would have fired 
8 defendants and pursued the much more attractive proposal by 
9 CPL without the hindering of the defendants. CPL's 
10 proposal was the only other possible alternative available 
11 to plaintiffs. 
12 Analysis of the CPL proposal show that: 1) it 
13 was only a proposal. It was indefinite in a lot of aspects 
14 and conditions. And one can only specuclate if it would 
15 have gotten any better through further negotiations without 
16 the hindrance of defendants. 
17 2) There was a significant difference in the 
18 total amount of money committed with serious questions of 
19 whether the $3.3 million necessary to buy competing bids 
20 would be available. 
21 3) The control issue of 60 percent by CPL for its 
22 commitment versus 49 percent—the eventual 49 percent from 
23 Northstar for its commitment on its face questioned the 
24 better business deal. 
25 Those factors and others contained in the 
8 
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1 exhibits and the arguments lead me to the conclusion that 
2 on its face, the CPL proposal would not have been a better 
3 business result for plaintiffs, absent the legal 
4 malpractice of the defendants. Therefore, based upon my 
5 analysis, defendant's motion for summary judgment is 
6 granted. 
7 Mr. Berman, Ms. Tomsic, please prepare the 
8 appropriate papers. 
9 MR. BERMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Anything further? 
11 MR. VAN WAGONER: No, your Honor. 
12 MR. BERMAN: Thank you very much. 
13 THE COURT: With that, we are in recess. 
14 (Proceedings concluded.) 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 I REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 
3 | STATE OF UTAH ) 
t SS 
4 | SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
5 
6 1 I, NORA S. WORTHEN, an official court reporter 
7 for the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
8 County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that I reported 
9 stenographically the proceedings in the matter of Jo-Ann W. 
10 Kilpatrick et al. vs. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, et al., 
11 Case No. 900901064 CV, and that the above and foregoing is 
12 I a true and correct transcript of said proceedings. 
13 
14 
15 | Dated this 7th day of January 1994 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 /^^S/^J^L 21 | X gf*t^ J> /^P?^^' 
Nora S. Worthen, CSR, RPR 
22 | Utah License No. 22-106373-7801 
23 
24 
25 
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EXHIBIT 3 
Order, 3/7/94 
Daniel L. Berman (A0304) 
Peggy A. Tomsic (3879) 
BERMAN, GAUFIN & TOMSIC 
50 South Main, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2 200 
Attorneys for Defendants 
MAP - 7 1994 
D.fviv Cc «x 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JO-ANN W. KILPATRICK, GEORGE 
L. GONZALES, JOSEPH C. LEE, 
DAVID B. LEE, MARILYN D. LEE, 
SIDNEY W. FOULGER, CLAYTON F. 
FOULGER, BRYANT F. FOULGER, 
BRENT K. PRATT, MOUNTAIN WEST 
TELEVISION COMPANY, a Utah 
general partnership, and MWT 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WILEY, REIN & FIELDING, a 
professional law partnership, 
and RICHARD E. WILEY, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900901064CV 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This matter having come on for hearing on January 6, 
1994 on Defendants' Motion for Sumraary Judgment, or in the 
alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of 
proximate cause; the Court having reviewed the memoranda, 
affidavits, and exhibits filed by Plaintiffs and Defendants, 
having heard oral argument and being duly advised in the 
premises; and the Court having issued an oral ruling on the 
record on January 7, 1994 granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. On the record it is incontrovertible that the 
Plaintiffs were represented during the critical time by their own 
lawyers Dow, Lohnes & Albertsons. Despite a factual dispute as 
to this finding, no reasonable jury could find to the contrary. 
2. There is no showing that the Defendant lawyers 
breached their professional duties to Plaintiffs by using, 
misusing, or abusing any confidential information of the 
Plaintiffs on any occasion. 
3. On the record it is uncontroverted that the 
Defendant lawyers were not and are not one and the same as 
Northstar Communications, Inc., Farragut Communications, Inc., or 
Allstate Insurance Company, business nonparties. 
4. The Plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing 
that any breach of duty or conduct by the defendant lawyers of 
which the Plaintiffs complain was the "but for" cause of any 
loss, injury or damage claimed by any Plaintiff. 
5. The Plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing 
that, in the absence of any breach of duty or conduct of the 
Defendant lawyers of which the Plaintiffs complain, there is a 
"reasonable likelihood" the better result with regard to each 
transaction for which the Plaintiffs claim damages would have 
2 
been achieved. Indeed, the record establishes that the proposal 
made by CPL in 1986 was the only other possible alternative 
available to Plaintiffs, and the CPL proposal on its face would 
not have been a better business result for Plaintiffs, absent the 
legal malpractice of Defendants. 
6. Proximate cause is an essential element of the 
Plaintiffs' claims of legal malpractice. 
7. Proximate cause requires that the breach of the 
lawyer's duty claimed be the "but for" -- direct and substantial 
-- cause of the Plaintiffs' injury and loss. 
8. Proximate cause, in addition to a showing of "but 
for" cause, requires that the Plaintiffs show, in the absence of 
the legal malpractice claimed, a "reasonable likelihood" that the 
better business or legal result for which Plaintiffs claim damage 
would have been achieved. 
9. Although the Plaintiffs have made an adequate 
showing that the Defendant lawyers breached their professional 
duties to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs have failed to make a 
sufficient showing that any breach of duty or conduct by the 
defendant lawyers proximately caused any Plaintiff any loss, 
injury or damage* 
10. There being no material issues of fact as to one 
of the essential elements of the Plaintiffs' claims of legal 
malpractice — proximate cause, the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby granted. 
3 
, / > 
DATED this day of March, 1994, 
BY THE COUS^r^? 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a copy of the within and 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON ISSUE OF CAUSATION was hand-delivered this /^T^day of March, 
1994, to: 
Harold G. Christensen, Esq. 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Rex E. Madsen, Esq. 
Richard A. Van Wagoner, Esq. 
Rodney R. Parker, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
, ML: Att^ 
ORDRDSMS.385 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 1995,1 caused two (2) true and correct 
copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to be hand-delivered to Daniel I. Berman and Peggy 
A. Tomsic of Berman, Gaufm & Tomsic, 50 South Main, #1250, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
